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Abstract
Should fundraisers ask a banker to donate “if he earns a bonus” or wait and ask after the bonus is known?
Standard EU theory predicts these are equivalent; loss-aversion and signaling models predict a larger commitment
before the bonus is known; theories of affect predict the reverse. In five experiments incorporating lab and field
elements (N=1363), we solicited donations from small lottery winnings , varying the conditionality of donations
between participants. Overall, we find conditional donations (“if you win”) exceeded ex-post donations. This
represents the first evidence on how pro-social behavior extends to conditional commitments over uncertain income,
with implications for charitable fundraising, giving pledges, and experimental methodology.
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1 Introduction
Most research on other-regarding behavior considers choices under certainty. However, decisions in this domain
often involve risk, uncertainty, and contingent plans. We provide unique evidence on how other-regarding
behavior extends to income uncertainty and to contingent commitments. This is motivated by a particular
practical question: what is the best way to ask for a charitable donation from an individual who may get an
uncertain bonus income? Should you ask her before—to make a contingent commitment to donate if she wins
the bonus or ask her after—to donate after her bonus has been revealed?
There are important differences between these two modes of asking which may impact behavior: (i) Before
commitments are from uncertain income. (ii) Before commitments to donate are not realized with certainty.
(iii) After commitments follow an experience of winning. If she is a standard expected utility maximizer only
caring about outcomes, this will not matter. In contrast, certain theories of affect predict that she will donate
more after winning. However, we show that under particular specifications, loss-aversion and signaling models
predict a larger commitment for giving conditionally, in advance of learning the outcome. This latter prediction
is largely substantiated by our evidence from a series of lab and web-based experiments, discussed below.
This is an important issue for policymakers and fundraisers. Many employees receive windfall payments
in supplement to their regular income. In the 2011/12 tax year, bonuses to UK workers totaled £37 billion, of
which £13 billion was in the financial sector, at an average rate of £12,000 per worker (ONS, 2012). In the USA,
Wall Street banks distributed $26.7 billion in bonuses in 2013 (NY Comptroller, 2014). Anecdotal evidence
suggests that a significant share of this bonus income was not fully anticipated.1In the wake of recession and
scandals in the financial markets, bankers have been encouraged to give back their bonuses, or donate them
to charity.2 Our evidence suggests it may be more effective to ask bankers to commit to donate from future
bonuses. Moreover, this question is relevant to situations in which individuals are asked or volunteer to donate
from actual or potential financial gains. Lottery organizers may include a tick-box to make a conditional pledge.
Ethical investment accounts could automatically donate gains that exceed expectations.3 This is not merely
hypothetical: several prominent movements and organizations ask students, workers, and entrepreneurs to
publicly pledge a share of their future income and profits.4
This also has implications for experimental methodology, in particular, the random lottery incentive scheme,
where only one stage is chosen randomly for payment (see Cubitt et al., 1998). Particularly where signaling
is relevant, subjects may not treat each stage independently, and may integrate their choices into a global
decision frame.
1. From our personal correspondence: “Most people at the top or the bottom of the performance level will know they’re (not) getting
a bonus—people in the middle will be unsure until they’re announced. Among the people who know they’re going to get a bonus, the
size of the bonus is uncertain until announced.”, Raj C: Hedge Fund Manager, London (2015). See also forum posts <http://www.quora.
com/Bonuses/How-accurately-can-an-employee-predict-his-or-her-annual-bonus-in-advance-e-g-in-the-banking-industry>, accessed 7 Feb,
2015.
2. “Johnson: Bankers should assuage guilt by giving bonuses to homeless scheme.” – The Guardian, 13 Feb 2009.
3. E..g., Triodos Bank offers a “Save and Donate” account <http://www.triodos.co.uk/en/personal/savings-overview/
charity-saver/>, accessed 29 Sep. 2017; however this currently involves fixed interest rates and a fixed donation share.
4. “Giving What We Can,” founded by Tony Ord, asks people to make a giving pledge to donate roughly 10% of their future in-
come. According to their website <https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/about-us/history/> (accessed 25 Sep 2017) they have over 3000
members who have donated over $24 million (and pledged to donate far more); a large share of whom are students, who presumably
face great uncertainty over their lifetime earnings. Thelifeyoucansave.org, promotes a smaller-percentage pledge with rates adjusted by
income and by country. The Founders pledge (https://founderspledge.com/about-us , accessed 12 Sept. 2016) asks tech entrepreneurs
who have yet to ‘cash out’ to make a legally-binding commitment to donate 2% or more of their potential proceeds to a social cause
of their choice. Motivated by our research, the London-based City Philanthropy recently held a “Bonus pledge think tank” to explore
this idea (See: http://www.cityphilanthropy.org.uk/events/1-bonus-pledge-think-tank and http://www.cityphilanthropy.org.uk/news/
call-city-firms-help-cabinet-office-research-%E2%80%98windfall%E2%80%99-giving, accessed 12 Sept. 2016).
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no direct economic evidence on the effect of the resolution of in-
come uncertainty on other-regarding behavior. Tonin et al. (2014) and Reinstein (2010) each ran experiments
involving charitable donation in uncertain environments, where subjects knew that only one of a series of
decisions would be implemented; both found that donations declined over time. According to Reinstein “if
individuals are not [expected utility] maximizers over outcomes but gain warm glow utility from unrealized
commitments, this decline could be attributed to satiation of warm glow”. In laboratory dictator games Brock
et al. (2013) and Sandroni et al. (2013) each found that social preferences and fairness concerns appear to
depend on a combination of ex post and ex ante concerns. Smith (2011) found that giving (to other subjects
who had incurred an income loss) was higher when giving decisions were made using the strategy method
than when subjects were asked ex-post. These results argue against a model where an individual maximizes
expected utility with a consistent utility function that considers only outcomes.
Grossman (2015) focused on measuring and differentiating self and social signaling. His laboratory exper-
iments (with a standard student sample) involved binary-choice dictator games where an individual’s choice
may be randomly overruled with a given probability. The treatments varied this probability, and whether the
“observer” (another subject or the experimenter) saw the outcome, the choice, and the probability of overrule.
In general, he found that the probability that the choice was overruled had neither a large nor a significant
effect on choices in any of the observability conditions. Our approaches differ substantially; in particular, our
focal treatment involves a conditional commitments from uncertain income.5
Generosity involving unconditional future commitments is a distinct but related issue. Breman (2011) ran a
field experiment asking donors to commit to increase their regular donation either immediately, in one months
time, or in two months time. She found the longest delay led to the greatest increase in contributions. Her
explanation is that the cost of giving occurs at the time of payment, while “the warm-glow ... will be experi-
enced at the time of committing to giving.”6 Commitments in Breman’s experiment could be reversed but they
rarely were. While Andreoni, Serra-Garcia (2016) also find greater "Give-Later" commitments (in longitudinal
laboratory experiments), they find frequent reneging on previous pledges, as well as heterogeneous dynamic
inconsistency.
Our evidence abstracts from the issue of delay: in our experiments the uncertainty is resolved almost im-
mediately and there is no difference in when the donations are realized. However, in real-world fundraising
applications (e.g., in the bankers’ bonuses context), asking for conditional donations of uncertain income is
likely to also mean asking for a delayed donation.
Our paper and experiments do not directly consider unconditional donation choices made before uncertain
income is resolved. There are several arguments for allowing people to vary their donation according to their
realized income, either by asking them after the uncertainty has been resolved or by allowing them to make a
conditional commitment. Individuals might be more generous if they can hedge in this way, effectively smooth-
5. Our experiments differ from his along several other dimensions (binary vs. continuous choices, different sets of probabilities,
with/without a real-effort task, session-level versus within-session variation, oral versus computer instructions), and we also provide
evidence from several field contexts. For our context that most resembles his—the laboratory Uncertain Collection treatment—we also
find a null result. In general, for our experiments involving students, we find small effects, which a standard laboratory sample size would
have limited power to detect.
6. Breman draws on Thaler et al. (2004), whose “Save More Tomorrow” experiment found that individuals save more when asked
to pre-commit a portion of future pay raises towards retirement savings. She extends the “pre-commitment for the future” part of their
treatment to the charitable domain; our experiments extend the commit uncertain salary increases effect (which the authors argue is driven
by loss aversion). These results largely support Andreoni, Payne (2003), who write that “a commitment to a charity may yield a warm-glow
[benefit] to the givers before ... the costs are paid”. This raises the question “when does the benefit of giving occur and how long does it
last?” By this logic we might expect to see charitable giving exclusively through end-of-life bequests, which would yield warm glow that
could be savored over one’s entire life. However, bequest giving is rare (Cabinet Office, 2011, Giving White Paper, HM Stationary Office.)
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ing their consumption. Note also that standard optimization predicts that people are better off when they can
make decisions after uncertainties are resolved. This might offer people a reason to delay making a commit-
ment whenever they are asked to donate and facing uncertain income; such delays and "transactions costs" are
seen to reduce contributions Knowles et al., 2015. As most people face a lifetime of financial uncertainties, a
fundraiser may thus be tempted to ask people to commit to making donations conditionally on certain financial
outcomes.
However, conditional commitments do involve a sort of uncertainty. Some previous work suggests that
uncertainty and ambiguity about recipients and the outcomes of donations may lead to more self-interested
behavior (e.g., Brock et al., 2013, Small et al., 2003). In particular Exley’s (2016) experimental subjects make
several series’ of choices between certain and uncertain payoffs for oneself and a charity. Her results suggest
that where subjects must choose between lotteries/certainties for themselves and a charity, they practice mo-
tivated reasoning (see Gino et al., 2016), overweighting or underweighting the probability of a loss in order to
justify less-generous behavior. Our evidence suggests that this "excuse-driven" response to risk does not extend
to conditional commitments (or at least, this does not outweigh the other factors favoring the Before mode).
Indeed, a simple extension of Exley’s model predicts that conditional donations should not be vulnerable to
motivated reasoning over probabilities. In considering a "give if you win" commitment, the tradeoff between
one’s own and the charity’s income is not affected by the probability of a win.
We present the results of a series of five experiments in distinct contexts, with complementary strengths,
each combining lab and field characteristics in a different way. Our experiments offer the first systematic insight
into contingent giving from known or uncertain income. To avoid contrast and experimenter-demand effects,
all experiments involve only between-subject treatment variation and only a single charitable ask; thus we use
large samples to detect moderate-sized effects. Table 1 in section 3 offers a brief summary of the differences
between our five experiments.
Our laboratory experiments offer a more controlled environment, where we can be sure subjects are making
decisions on their own, they cannot communicate, and they can tangibly verify that outcomes are randomly
determined (see Maniadis et al., 2014). Our web-based evidence offers environmental validity and is less prone
to experimenter demand. Our lab experiments varied the presentation of the earnings as random (the “bonus”
being awarded with 50% probability) and the timing of the contribution request. Depending on the treatment,
we observed conditional pre-commitments for (losing and) winning states or decisions after winning (or losing)
a lottery. While the lab experiment involved two levels of earnings and five treatments, we focus on the two
treatments that most parallel those in our web-based experiments.7
In all of the experiments the results are in the same direction: people committed to donate more when asked
immediately before they knew if they had won. Although these differences are statistically significant in only
some of these experimental contexts (two at p<0.01 and one at p<0.10), they are strongly significant when
we pool across all experiments. Overall, conditional donations (“if you win”) were 25% higher (3.8 percentage
points higher) in the Before treatments (Table 4). The effect was particularly strong and significant in our
web-based experiment using non-student participants: giving nearly doubled, and its incidence increased by
7. Given the large variance in donation choices we had limited power to detect moderate-sized differences among all of these. Thus,
we only report them in the appendix for completeness. The other three treatments were the following. Before Both: a separate ex-ante
decision for losing and winning states. Uncertain Collection: the income was known and certain, but there was only a 50% chance that
a committed donation was to be collected. Benchmark: either low or high income, but with no income uncertainty. Our results are very
similar if we pool this Benchmark treatment with the After treatment reported below, and also similar (but stronger) if we pool the Before
and Before Both (if win) treatments.
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50%. Further modelling suggests a non-linear relationship: the Before treatment has a larger effect for those
predicted (by pre-determined observables like age and gender) to donate less.
2 Basic Setup and Predictions
In this section we offer a theoretical perspective on giving when income is uncertain. Consider two income
levels, w and `, where w> `≥ 0. The decision maker knows she is facing a lottery with a non-degenerate
probability p of winning w and a probability 1− p of losing and earning `. Consider the following settings.
Suppose, at least for now, that a donation is only feasible or reasonable after winning the lottery.
After setting (A): Income is unknown until a lottery is resolved, and she learns whether she has won or lost
the lottery. If she has won, she learns her income and then is immediately asked to donate to a specific
charity. She donates ga ≥ 0.8
Before setting (B): Income is unknown until a lottery is resolved. Before she learns the outcome, she is asked
to make a binding commitment to donate to a specific charity if she wins w. She commits to give g b ≥ 0 if
she wins (if she loses nothing is collected).
Our main question is: “how does her commitment or pledge in the Before setting, to donate if she wins, compare
to her donation in the After setting when she has already won?”, i.e. “what is the relationship between g b and
ga?” (In appendix A we define additional settings and derive predictions for these and for donations from the
lower income, further distinguishing among the below theories. However, as our laboratory experiment proved
underpowered to distinguish among these, we present these only in the appendix, to motivate future work.)
2.1 Expected utility maximization over outcomes
In most previous models of charitable giving, only an individual’s realized contribution (and consumption) af-
fects her utility. She may care about the total amount of the public good provided (Becker, 1974), she may gain
warm glow from the amount of her own income she has actually given away (one interpretation of Andreoni,
1990), or she may care about her impact on outcomes (Duncan, 2004) or on an individual she identifies with
(Atkinson, 2009). Although these theoretical papers generally do not consider uncertain environments, they
have been applied to such contexts (e.g., Vesterlund 2003; DellaVigna et al. 2012, as well as in numerous labo-
ratory experiments). While other models emphasize the reputation and signaling benefits of giving (Harbaugh,
1998), self-signaling (Benabou et al., 2006), moral concerns of reciprocity (Sugden, 1984), or a Kantian mo-
tive (Sugden, 1982; Roemer, 2010), these have been modeled solely in terms of actual donations.9 Because of
this, the timing and uncertainty of the decision (i.e., whether it is a sure thing or a prospect) is irrelevant to
the individual’s choice. This will hold for any model that can be expressed in terms of expected utilities over
outcomes; this is stated in prediction 1 and is trivially proven in Appendix A.1.
Prediction 1. Expected utility maximizers: ga = g b.
8. If she loses, she may also be asked to give. However, in three of five of our experiments we did not ask losers to donate, and
we have limited statistical power our power to make relevant comparisons here. Thus we focus on the (conditional) donations from the
"winning" income g t for treatments t ∈ {a, b}. We consider the donations from the losing income (labeled g t
`
) in the appendix and very
occasionally below.
9. To be precise, the reciprocity and Kantian models mentioned are procedural and not based on utility-maximization; still, these
do not have an explicit role for unrealized commitments. We also note that more recent work has argued, in an experimental context, that
intentions and commitments may yield direct utility and signaling value; we return to this later.
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2.2 Signaling and self-signaling
Donating with certainty or with some probability may allow the individual to differentiate herself from “worse
types”, and this may benefit her reputation or self-esteem (Benabou et al., 2006), yielding a utility gain. On the
other hand, she is sacrificing expected income, hence sacrificing utility from consumption. Both the signaling
benefit and the utility of additional income may not only be a function of the expected values, but may depend
on the probability distribution.
While previous work (e.g., Tonin et al., 2014) allows benefits via self-signaling to accumulate even for
unrealized uncertain donations, in this paper we consider that the signaling value itself may be lower when
the probability of realizing the commitment decreases. In fact, the idea that people are able to positively signal
to themselves or others by committing to give with positive probability, even if the gift is not realized, is
supported by some previous evidence (e.g., Sandroni et al., 2013.)10
We offer a simple signaling model (see Appendix A.2 for derivations and extensions to additional settings)
with two types of agents (or two types of self): one who gets an inherent benefit from donating to the charity (a
“good type”), and one who does not (a “bad type”).11 We demonstrate that uncertain collection of committed
donations can lead to larger (conditional) donations. We focus on parameter values where, at the good types’
preferred donation (ignoring signaling), the bad types have an incentive to pool to gain reputation; i.e., "the
separation constraint binds" (see appendix: condition 4). Here, as the probability of collection decreases below
one, the level of conditional-on-collection donations that can be sustained as an equilibrium satisfying the
intuitive criterion increases. Essentially, as the intent to donate can still be demonstrated, while the cost of
actually donating will only be paid with a probability less than one, the (minimum) conditional-on-collection
donation must increase in order to separate types.
If an individual only recalls his or her own true type with error, the signaling model can be considered as
an equivalent self -signaling model, as noted in Benabou et al. (2006; 2011).
Prediction 2. Signaling generosity, where the separation constraint binds
g b > ga, for good types, while bad types are unaffected by the treatment.
2.3 Loss Aversion and Reference Points
When making—even riskless—choices, it is often argued that decisions are influenced by anticipated gains
and losses relative to a reference point (see Tversky et al., 1991). Thaler et al. (2004) claim “... once house-
holds get used to a particular level of disposable income, they tend to view reductions in that level as a loss.”
In considering this model, we suppose the individual has a reference point over her own consumption, not in-
10. Nearly a third of Sandroni et al. (2013)’s dictator subjects demonstrated a strict preference for a coin flip between increasing
their own and another’s payoff, preferring this to getting either alternative with certainty. This choice may be driven by a diminishing
returns to both private consumption and the benefits of the pro-social choice, (e.g., self-signaling, impact, or warm glow), if a commitment
to donate with some probability itself yields these benefits.
11. This model is distinct from Grossman (2015). He models a continuum of types with binary choices, where the outcome is not
entirely deterministic: either choice may be overruled by nature with a known probability. He further solved for cases varying the observer’s
information about the choice and environment. As in our model, both the signaling value and the material cost of a particular donation
increase in the probability the donation is realized. In his model, where the observer sees only the choice and not the probability, a
donation commitment (of a specified size) is more likely where the donation is collected with a lower probability, because signaling
is “cheaper”. However, in considering a varying probability of realization, Grossman only compares environments where the externally-
observed probability of realization—and thus the external signaling value—is constant. He does not model a case where the observer
(or future self) sees both the choice and the probability, as in our model, and these vary together. This case is particularly relevant to
donations from uncertain income. For the “after” ask, the probability of realization is one, and this is common knowledge to the fundraiser
and potential donor. For the “before ask” we consider, it is common knowledge that this probability is less than one. However, in the real
world, the exact probability of a bonus may not be common-knowledge; the impact of this may be considered in later work.
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cluding charitable giving, and her utility function sums a standard reference-independent term and a gain-loss
component. Her donation decision, whether stochastic or certain, anticipates how the donation will reduce the
remaining wealth available for her own consumption. If this will fall below her reference point, she will incur
a psychological loss. We assume there is no gain-loss utility over the donation itself (i.e., a single target, as in
Camerer et al., 1997).12
While the reference point may change over time, we assume here that she is myopic in the sense that
when making a decision she does not anticipate these changes. For simplicity, we consider a utility function
embodying a linear loss function, i.e.,
v(x , g,pi) =
(
u(x) + ω(Dg) if x ≥ pi
u(x) − δ[u(pi) − u(x)] + ω(Dg) if x < pi;
subject to the budget constraint x + g ≤ E,
where x represents own consumption, g is the committed donation expenditure and D indicates whether
it is realized, pi is a reference point, specified below, and δ is a (strictly) positive constant. Here u(·), the sub-
utility of own-consumption, is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, as is the “warm glow” function
ω(·). All derivations are in the appendix.
Suppose the reference point always corresponds to the expected future income at the point of the decision,
the maximum own-consumption one could achieve if one’s investments paid their expected value. This implies
that contributions incur a loss in all cases expect for conditional contributions from an expected win, implying
greater contributions in the Before than in the other treatments, i.e.:
Prediction 3. Loss Aversion, expected income, immediate adjustment
g b > ga, provided g b < w − (pw + (1 − p)l)).
This prediction extends to alternate assumptions over the reference consumption basket.13 However, it does
not apply to any model with loss-aversion; it depends on several key assumptions. It is crucial that in the After
treatment the reference point for own consumption corresponds to the (new) expected wealth, or adjusts at
least partly to the realized income. If we assume the reference point is unchanged throughout the relevant
decision period, the Before and After donations will be equivalent. We might alternatively allow reference
points and gain-loss utility for both own-consumption and charitable giving, and also allow these to adjust to
the planned donation after the income is realized. Then, under a preferred personal equilibrium (Koszegi et al.,
2006) even loss-averse individuals may choose ga = g b (see online appendix B.1).
12. This may hold if donating nothing and using all income for own-consumption is typically seen as the default, thus the basis for a
reference point. Note that this model’s predictions would be qualitatively the same if there were two targets, but the gain-loss utility were
far more salient for consumption targets than for giving targets.
13. The reference consumption basket might be based on her expectations before being asked to donate, thus deducting no donation;
alternately, it may have anticipated a small probability of an ask, or it might immediately subtract the expected value of the conditional
donation after the ask. For any of these the reference consumption is still less than the higher earnings w, and the above prediction will
attain. Note that we can consider the “ask” as a special shock motivating giving by changing the environment/context or temporarily
adjusting the utility function to make the utility slope of giving particularly steep; see Andreoni, Rao (2011) and models in Reinstein
(2011) and Kotzebue et al. (2009). Hence we may predict individuals give a larger share of their experimental “winnings” than the normal
share of their income that they donate.
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2.4 Aective state (unanticipated) and generosity
A favorable realization of a lottery may put people in a good mood, while an unfavorable outcome may do
the opposite. Theories and evidence on the interaction of affective state and generosity point to more giving
when an individual is in a positive mood (Levin et al., 1975; Weyant, 1978; Underwood et al., 1976; Kidd
et al., 2013; Drouvelis et al., 2016). On the other hand Fishbach et al. (2007) offer mixed evidence, and Kuhn
et al. (2011), find “greater lottery winnings do not raise the likelihood that a household will donate its fee for
completing our survey to charity”. Putting this together we might predict greater generosity after a prize has
been won, relative to before the prize outcome is known, provided individuals do not anticipate their mood
changes when making conditional donations.14
Prediction 4. Affective state: ga > g b
3 Designs and Implementation
We ran a series of five experiments across over different contexts, demographics, framings, and rules. For
transparency, we report on all of the experiments that we ran as part of this project.15 We present and analyze
(i) the entire project and (ii) the two experiments that we preregistered with the AEA RCT registry, declaring
our study parameters, hypotheses, and analysis plan.16
The contextual variations impart a benefit. Gathering evidence over domains varying in the “distribution
of the characteristics of the units” (participant demographics) and the “specific nature of the treatments [and]
treatment rate” helps us to explore the “credibility of generalizing to other settings”, i.e., the sensitivity of the
results to the context, the framing, and the subject pool (Athey et al., 2017).
Our lab experiment (involving a field commodity: the charitable donation) permits greater control and
design flexibility. The four web-based experiments have many of the usually cited advantages of field experi-
ments (see Harrison et al., 2004). In particular, they offer less risk of experimenter demand effects and reflect
more naturalistic, less self-conscious behavior: participants were unlikely to know they were participating in
an experiment, and still less likely to consider that they were in an experiment focused on charitable giving.
There is also strong environmental validity. These experiments resemble real-world contexts that participants
may be accustomed to: universities often run employability promotions, researchers run broad surveys and
often give participants the option to donate their earnings, many promotions involve a prize lottery, and web
sites often ask for donations.
Table 1 presents a summary of the experiments highlighting the most important differences between our ex-
periments. These variations were either part of our initial design (e.g., sensitivity to a non-student sample, and
to a varying the probability of realization), responses to referees’ suggestions (e.g., the opportunity to reverse
a Before commitment), or reflect feasibility concerns and calibration adjustments to achieve an intermediate
baseline rate of contributions.
14. Similar predictions could arise out of an (indirect) reciprocity model (see Simpson et al., 2008), e.g., if the lottery’s sponsor were
the charity itself, or were believed to be sympathetic to the charity; the reciprocity motive would also have to depend on the realization
of the “gift” and not only its probabilistic implementation.
15. Chronologically, we ran the experiments in the reverse order presented below; we discuss the logic of this sequence in the appendix
section D.1. We exclude one experiment we ran at a Cat Fair in 2010 which we ended after about 12 observations, after it became clear
that this was an environment unlikely to provide much variation in donation behavior.
16. As noted in Button et al., 2013, "pre-registration clarifies whether analyses are confirmatory or exploratory, encourages well-
powered studies and reduces opportunities for non-transparent data mining and selective reporting."
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However, key elements were the same across experiments. Each experiment involved very similar Before
and After treatments, resembling the settings discussed in section 2; each participant made this charitable deci-
sion (at most) once, with between-subject variation. The chance to win a prize was always tied to participation
in an encouraged activity or performing a task. Uncertainty over the prize was always resolved immediately
after the Before donation choice or immediately before the After donation choice. All charitable “asks” required
participants to make an active decision, with a choice architecture that weakly suggested donating. We always
used well-known charities including an international-poverty-related charity, and we always provided a means
to verify that donations were actually passed to the charities. For all experiments other than Valentine’s, partici-
pants could choose among two chats, committed donations were automatically deducted from earnings/prizes,
and we supplemented each donation with a 10% or 25% match.
Table 1. Summary of Experiments
Label
Context
Date Participants Population Location Donation
Fulfillment
Base
pay
Don. stake Prob(Win) Charity(s)
Match
%
total usable
Prolific
Employment
choices
2017 320 240
General,
non-
student
population
UK Automatic
(reversible)
£1 £10 Money 50% or
10%
Oxfam,
British
Heart Fdn
25%
Omnibus
Internet
survey,
ESSEXLab
recruitment
2017 734 460
Students &
staff
Essex Automatic 0
£10
Amazon
voucher
50% Oxfam,
British
Heart Fdn
25%
Employability
Employability
survey
2013–14 592 375 Students Essex Automatic 0
£20
Restaurant
or Amazon
25% Oxfam,
WWF
10%
Laboratory
Fluid
intelligence
measure
2013–16 433 131 Students
Mannheim,
Dusseldorf
Automatic €7 €14 Money 50% Bread for
the World,
WWF
-
Valentine’s
Valentine’s
cards
2012 205 159
Students &
staff
Essex,
Bristol,
Warwick
Active
follow-up
0
£20 (£30)
Restaurant
Ambiguous Right to
Play
-
Notes: This table summarizes the most important features of the experiments reported. The Prolific study also enabled us to use a rich set
of previously collected background variables. “Usable” refers to participants in the treatments described; namely, they were asked a single
time to make a donation from the listed “Donation stake” in either the Before or the After context.
In addition to the web links to our experimental instruments (below), we provide further details on each
experiment, including several key screen shots, and information on other treatment arms in the appendix.
3.1 Pre-registered experiments
3.1.1 Prolic. From July 29 through August 1 2017, we recruited 320 participants through Prolific Academic
(prolific.ac), a widely-used recruitment platform for researchers and startups (an additional five participants
began but did not complete the survey). We advertised our study as “Employment choices (basic payment
plus bonus opportunities)”, promising a base pay of £1 and a duration of about ten minutes (mean actual
response time was 5.9 minutes, median 4.3 minutes). We screened for only non-student UK residents, native-
English speakers, aged 18 and older, and who had not done any of our previous studies. This left 4212 eligible
participants, who were randomly selected to be invited via batched emails from Prolific. The entry page for
eligible participants is given in the appendix figure D.0.
The study began with our non-deception rules and a consent form. We next announced "If you complete
this survey, you have a 50% [alt: 10%] chance of winning a £10 Amazon voucher. After you complete this
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survey, we will reveal whether you have won this prize and explain how to claim it"; corresponding to the
treatments shown below.
Next, mainly as a “non-deceptive obfuscation” (Zizzo, 2010) we presented a vignette involving a job inter-
view for an “Assurance Trainee” position, and a series of hypothetical questions about requested and anticipated
salary. We next elicited self-reported happiness, followed by a series of unincentivized verbal crystallized in-
telligence questions. The Before and After donation treatments (and prize realizations) followed this. Finally
they were asked non-incentivized risk-preference, trust elicitation, and (again) happiness questions.
We next presented the following (randomly allocated) treatments.
Before-50% These 80 participants were first asked to make a conditional commitment, on the screen shown
in figure 1. On the next screen those who commited to donate chose whether they wanted their donation to
go to Oxfam or the British Heart Foundation. They next learned if they had won (winners’ screen: figure ??).
Next, “Before-winners” (after learning they had won) were reminded of their donation (or non-donation)
choice, and asked “Would you like to revise your donation decision?” If they chose to revise, they were
presented the donation choice once again (with the language from the After treatment, as in screen 2).17
Before-10% 80 participants were assigned to this treatment, which was identical to Before-50%, but with a
10% chance of winning the £10 (which was announced upfront).
After-50% 160 participants were assigned to this treatment, with a 50% chance of winning the £10 prize.
After the above, the 80 winners saw the screen in figure 3. Next, (winners), were asked to donate, on the
screen depicted in figure 2. On the next screen those who commited to donate chose their preferred charity.
A copy of the full experimental instrument can be viewed and tested at https://goo.gl/xZWDqg.18 In addi-
tion, we outline key implementation details in the annotated pre-registration provided in the additional online
materials.
While participants in Prolific are in general aware that they are being paid to participate in research and
product testing, it seems unlikely that our participants realized that our study concerned charitable giving.
Participants spent the largemajority of their time on the employment and intelligence questions, and essentially
only saw a single screen involving charitable giving. Note that Prolific already gives their participants the
opportunity to donate their base pay to one of two charities after each experiment. In a separate survey of 190
participants (details available by request) we found that 97% of them knew about Prolific’s donation option
(although only 17% could correctly identify either of the charities Prolific works with). This context may further
reduce the extent to which our charitable treatments were perceived as experimental. None of our participants
donated the base payments from our study, and only 1 of 240 had ever previously donated via Prolific.
This experiment involved two features we did not use in any of the other experiments: the Before-10%
treatment allowed us to consider the sensitivity of this treatment to the probability of realization; and the op-
portunity for Beforewinners to adjust their donations allowed us to consider the strength of these commitments
and the importance of making them binding. We return to this in section 4.3.
17. As the opportunity to revise was a surprise, and the geographically-dispersed Prolific participants were unlikely to have commu-
nicated (even if they had been in the same treatment), we consider the initial donation decision in the Before-50% and After-50% to to
be comparable to the Before and After treatments in our other experiments. All results presented below are based on the initial (rather
than the revised) donation choices; however, results are not sensitive to this exclusion.
18. This link will cycle through each of the treatments. You can type any characters in the box requesting a “Prolific ID”; typing “skip”
will skip the vignettes and verbal intelligence questions.
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Figure 1. Prolific: Before 50% treatment
Figure 2. Prolific: After treatment
Figure 3. Prolific: Screen announcing win (for Before and After winners)
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3.1.2 Omnibus . We ran our “Omnibus” field experiment in June 2017.19 Existing ESSEXLab participants
(mainly University of Essex students) were awarded £10 Amazon prizes with 50% probability in exchange
for completing a wide-ranging omnibus survey. On June 1, nearly the entire pool of 2736 ESSEXLab partici-
pants were emailed a direct personalized link with an invitation to take the Omnibus; roughly half of these
were randomly assigned to our study, of which we included the first 600 to respond. Non-responders were
reminded one and two weeks later. We gave them a deadline of June 18, and provided further information
about the Omnibus.20 Roughly 89% of those who began the survey completed it; median total response time
was 12.8 minutes among completers.
After clicking the link, the first screen noted “[.. .] you have a 50% chance of winning a £10 Amazon voucher.
After you complete this survey, we will reveal whether you have won this prize and explain how to claim
it.” Chosen donations were automatically deducted from prizes, and participants could choose between two
charities, here Oxfam or the British Heart Foundation. The Before and After treatments were block-randomized
(stratified) by gender. The language for the Before and After treatments was extremely similar to the comparable
treatments–Before-50% and After–in the Prolific experiment, shown in the previous subsection.
3.1.3 AEA registration of design, hypotheses, and analysis plans. We registered our Omnibus and Prolific
experiments with the AEA registry in advance of conducting these studies. Our registered plans, both initial
and revised, can be found at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2180; in the online appendix to this
paper, we provide an annotated excerpt.21 We registered a pre-analysis plan, including power calculations, and
including our plans to bifurcate our estimates by gender, indicated religiosity, and stated risk-aversion (for the
Omnibus) and also by initial stated-happiness (for the Prolific study). As shown below, some of these interac-
tions proved significant (as well as some not pre-registered), but the heterogeneity appears to be entangled
with a nonlinear treatment response.
3.2 Non-preregistered experiments
3.2.1 Employability. Our “Employability” field experiment was run in 2013/14 in the context of a career-
awareness promotion funded and announced by the University of Essex Faculty of Social Sciences. Participants
had a known (25%) probability winning a prize worth £20 (an Amazon or dinner voucher). As noted, donation
commitments were automatically deducted from the value of the voucher. We obtained 352 valid responses that
involved a donation choice. Further details of this experiment are given in appendix D.6.22
3.2.2 Laboratory Experiment (Before and After treatments only). The laboratory environment permitted us
to run a variety of treatments; however most of these comparisons proved to be under-powered. We discuss
these in more detail in appendix D.3), and also give more complete details of the lab experiments. We focus
here on the Before and After lab treatments. Subjects in these treatments first performed a real-effort task, and
were told they would be rewarded €7 for this independently of their performance. They were next told “with a
probability of 50 percent you will be rewarded a bonus of €7 on top of your already acquired income of €7.” This
19. A copy of the experimental instrument can be tested at https://goo.gl/vmHEK6; this will cycle through each of the treatments.
20. This Omnibus was funded as an ESSEXLab innovation. Survey questions were unincentivised, and included demographics, psy-
chometrics, political attitudes, and economic beliefs and preferences. The text of the invitation email sent to participants is given in our
online appendix.
21. Some details were revised and registered after the initial registry but before the experiment began. The history of changes to
the registration can be seen at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2180/history/19934. Additional common sense small changes
were made after the experiment began for feasibility reasons, as noted.
22. A copy of the experimental instrument can be tested at https://goo.gl/qSvhi1; this will cycle through each of the treatments.
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was followed by Before and After donation treatments, including a 25% match rate, which closely resembled
those in our other studies. The laboratory permitted strong control: subjects could not communicate with
others, and we took strong measures to convincingly guarantee anonymity and demonstrate to the subjects
that neither their performance nor their donation choices could affect their chances of winning.23
These experiments were run in Düsseldorf and Mannheim on a standard experimental subject pool (recruit-
ment was conducted via ORSEE; Greiner, 2004), using virtually identical protocols and zTree code at each lab
(Fischbacher, 2007). We ran nine sessions over five days in January–February 2013 and November 2014, and
24 sessions over 7 days in March–April 2016. A complete set of relevant screen shots and translations are
available in our online appendix.
3.2.3 Valentine’s . In 2012 we ran an experiment tied to a St. Valentine’s Day E-card web site accessible at
three UK universities (Bristol, Essex, and Warwick); full details are in Appendix D.5, with further implemen-
tation materials provided in the online appendix. We offered a lottery for restaurant vouchers (worth roughly
£20-30) as a participation incentive; participants were told the total number of restaurant vouchers to be given
away, but not the exact chances of winning.
In this experiment pledges to donate were not binding in either treatment; a student who pledged had to
make an effort actively follow with this donation. However, our evidence from the Prolific experiment suggests
that these pledges weremade sincerely.We discuss this inmore detail in Appendix D.5. Another unique element:
in the Valentine’s experiment we asked those “losers” who did not win the prize if they would like to donate;
however, 0/47 did so. We return to this in section 4.3.
3.3 Randomization tests and summary statistics
In Appendix E.1 we present summary statistics along with evidence that our randomization successfully bal-
anced the treatments, for all experiments. Tables E.2 and ?? compare the two treatments for the web-based
experiments and the four treatments from the laboratory experiment. The mean values of observable variables
are similar across treatments, and we do not detect significant differences for the great majority of tests. In the
Prolific experiment, there is some imbalance by age: those in the Before trial are significant older.24 However,
our results are barely affected by including controls for age (cf. Table 6), and robust to other reasonable control
strategies, as table E.10 illustrates.
4 Results
We first compare the donations in the Before and After treatments in each experiment. As seen in Figure 4,
in each experiment average donations were higher in the Before treatment relative to the After treatment,
although the differences are sometimes within the conventional standard-error margin. Table 2 reports the
incidence of donating a positive amount, as well as the shares of the endowments donated by treatment, for
each experiment, and pooling across experiments.25
23. However, even in this context, we cannot rule out a signaling motive, including (probablistic) signalling to experimenters, to
oneself, or to peers in later conversations, given an aversion to lying. We discuss this further in the appendix.
24. The difference is likely due to an unlucky draw and multiple hypothesis testing. Attrition in Prolific was tiny: only 5 of 325 par-
ticipants who began this survey quit (typically before reaching the prize/donation stage) or timed out.
25. All donations are reported in Euros. Donations from the UK experiments are evaluated at an exchange rate of 1.1971 EUR/GBP
(October 1, 2013 rate). For comparability across experiments, in this subsection we do not report on donations from the lower income in
the lab (recall that losers in the most of the field experiments were not asked to donate).
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Bars: estimated standard deviations.
Figure 4. Mean share committed by experiment, by Before vs. After
Table 2. Summary Statistics: Shares of endowments donated by treatment; Nonparametric tests
Pooled Prolific Omnibus Employability Laboratory Valentine’s
After
Incidence 0.42 0.40 0.50 0.31 0.64 0.13
Mean 0.15 0.10 0.25 0.07 0.16 0.01
Median 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.00
75th pctl 0.20 0.20 0.50 0.05 0.29 0.00
Std. dev. (0.26) (0.15) (0.35) (0.15) (0.19) (0.04)
Before
Incidence 0.48 0.60 0.56 0.31 0.74 0.35
Mean 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.09 0.20 0.05
Median 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.00
75th pctl. 0.25 0.30 0.50 0.05 0.29 0.05
Std. dev. (0.27) (0.23) (0.34) (0.20) (0.19) (0.09)
Total
Incidence 0.46 0.53 0.54 0.31 0.70 0.28
Mean 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.08 0.18 0.04
Median 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.00
75th pctl. 0.20 0.20 0.50 0.05 0.29 0.05
Std. dev. (0.26) (0.22) (0.35) (0.19) (0.19) (0.08)
Non-parametric tests
Diff. in incidence -0.06 -0.20 -0.06 -0.00 -0.10 -0.22
p-value (Fisher) 0.05 0.00 0.28 1.00 0.25 0.00
Diff. in means -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
p-value (rank sum) 0.05 0.00 0.32 0.81 0.14 0.00
Observations 1363 240 460 375 129 159
Notes: Average proportion of earnings donated for the Before treatment versus the After treatment in each experiment. For the Lab
experiment, this excludes data from the Certain, Before-Both, and Uncertain treatments. We exclude all participants with the lower earnings
(lab) and all those in the After treatments who did not win the prizes (and thus were not asked to donate). "Incidence": share donating
a positive amount. At the bottom we report p-values for tests of differences between outcomes in Before and After treatments, from
exact-tests (for incidence) and for rank-sum and t-tests (for proportion donated).
13
Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Donations levels and incidence by experiment (winners only)
Panel A: Levels Prolific Lab Employability Omnibus Valentines
Before 0.90*** 0.85* 0.49 0.24 0.92***
[95% CI] [0.40,1.40] [-0.16,1.86] [-0.50,1.49] [-0.57,1.05] [0.42,1.42]
(p-value) (0.0004) (0.099) (0.330) (0.568) (0.0004)
Constant 0.97*** 1.88*** 1.58*** 2.98*** 0.35**
[0.63,1.32] [1.29,2.47] [0.75,2.42] [2.31,3.64] [0.061,0.63]
Observations 240 129 375 460 159
Panel B: Incidence Prolific Lab Employability Omnibus Valentines
Before 0.20*** 0.097 0.0033 0.056 0.21***
[95% CI] [0.068,0.33] [-0.099,0.29] [-0.11,0.12] [-0.041,0.15] [0.080,0.34]
(p-value) (0.003) (0.328) (0.956) (0.257) (0.002)
Constant 0.40*** 0.65*** 0.31*** 0.50*** 0.13***
[0.29,0.51] [0.50,0.80] [0.20,0.41] [0.42,0.58] [0.041,0.23]
Observations 240 129 375 460 159
Notes: This table reports coefficients, 95% confidence intervals, standard errors, and t-test p-values from ordinary least squares regressions
on donation levels (top) and incidence (bottom) for the Before treatment versus the After treatment in each experiment. Here we also
include p-values for future meta- and p-curve analysis (see Simonsohn et al., 2014). These results exclude participants in the After
treatment who did not win. The Lab column also includes a hidden dummy for the laboratory location; no other columns include controls.
We account for potential correlated errors at the session level for the lab experiments, Employability, Omnibus, and Valentines, and date-
level for Prolific, using cluster-robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Results are very similar for
nonparametric tests (table 2), and across a variety of specifications, clusterings, and control strategies; see appendix, table E.10.
Table 3 reports ordinary least squares regressions on donation levels (above) and incidence (below) for the
Before treatment versus the After treatment in each experiment, excluding participants who earned the lower
level of income (or who failed to win the prize).
Each of our experiments suggest an effect in the same direction–a positive effect of “asking before” on do-
nation behavior. The impact is particularly large and highly-significant in the Prolific experiment, suggesting
that the Before treatment might be most effective for non-students. However, in both regression analysis (Ta-
ble 3) and in simpler tests (Table 2), in about half of our experiments this fails to reach conventional levels of
statistical significance. This may stem from a lack of power (noted in AEA-registered power tests). As shown in
Table E.13, the between-subject variance in donation behavior is large, both here and in previous work. For all
regression tables we present 95% confidence intervals to convey the precision of our estimates, and to allow
inference about the bounds of our effect. In many cases these bounds are wide; e.g., for the Omnibus trial the
effect is bounded above at over 1/3 of the mean donation.
We pool our data across all of our experiments to perform ameta-analysis, allowing greater statistical power.
For statistical inference, we consider this as a draw from a population composed of likely participants in each
of our experiments, with shares corresponding to our relative sample sizes of UK students, German students,
and UK nonstudents. In Figure 5 we present a histogram of the shares of endowment donated, pooled over all
experiments. This reveals a small shift away from zero donations towards moderate donations. In order to take
into account potential session-specific correlated errors (for the lab experiments) and date-specific correlated
errors (for the field experiments) we use cluster-robust standard errors at these levels.
All regressions (except where noted) include de-meaned dummies for each experiment, and the interac-
tions of these with the Before treatment. This estimator recovers the average treatment effect (ATE) for our
source population in the presence of heterogeneity. In contrast, OLS estimators are more efficient if effects are
homogenous, but they achieve this efficiency by (over)weighting observations (relative to shares of the source
population) with higher conditional variance in the treatment and less residual variance in the outcome vari-
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Black lines denote the Before treatment. Grey bars denote the After treatment.
Figure 5. Histograms of shares donated, pooled over all experiments
Notes: Average proportion of earnings donated for the Before treatment versus the After treatment, pooling across all experiments. For the
Lab experiment, this excludes data from the Certain, Before-Both, and Uncertain treatments. We exclude all participants with the lower
earnings (lab) and all those who did not win the prizes. The vertical lines indicate the 75th and 90th percentile of the pooled donation
share.
able. With heterogeneous treatment effects this yields an arbitrarily weighted estimate of treatment effects
(Angrist J. D. and J. S. Pischke, 2008, p. 58), while the "fully interacted" estimator recovers the ATE (see Athey
et al., 2017, equation 5.4). However, our results are similar with or without these interactions, as well as with
additional interactions by specific pre-determined variables (table E.7).26
As shown in Table 4, the difference for the Before and After treatments is strongly statistically significant
in the pooled data and the pooled 95% confidence interval is between 1% and 6% percent of the endowment,
implying a proportional increase of 6%-38% of the average donation rate.
26. We provide robustness checks with specifications of all models in the appendix. Variable-selection models (elastic-net and lasso;
details upon request) with penalties for non-treatment pre-determined control variables also yielded similar results.
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Table 4. Ordinary least squares regressions on donations shares; Pooled over experiments
Pooled Pooled, preregistered only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion Level Incidence Proportion Level Incidence
b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p
Before 0.035*** 0.526*** 0.097*** 0.071*** 0.723*** 0.162***
[0.011,0.060] [0.199,0.854] [0.049,0.144] [0.031,0.112] [0.300,1.146] [0.062,0.263]
(0.012) (0.167) (0.024) (0.021) (0.216) (0.051)
(0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.138*** 1.898*** 0.433*** 0.138*** 1.513*** 0.425***
[0.117,0.158] [1.610,2.186] [0.389,0.478] [0.109,0.167] [1.207,1.820] [0.343,0.508]
(0.011) (0.147) (0.023) (0.015) (0.156) (0.042)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experiment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1363 1363 1363 700 700 700
Clusters 742 742 742 700 700 700
Notes: This table reports coefficients, 95% confidence intervals, standard errors, and t-test p-values from ordinary least squares regres-
sions. Dependent variables are donations as shares of endowment, donation levels, donation incidence for the Before treatment versus
the After treatment. Results exclude participants in the After treatment who did not win. We run pooled analysis comparing all experi-
ments (Columns 1 to 3) and for the pre-registered experiments only (Omnibus and Prolific). All regressions include experiment-specific
de-meaned dummy controls, which subsume a control for differing endowments, as well as the interactions of these with the Before treat-
ment. We account for potential correlated errors at the session level for the lab experiments using cluster-robust standard errors, while
assuming independence on the internet based experiments. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Results are very similar for
nonparametric tests (table 2), and across a variety of specifications, clusterings, and control strategies; see appendix, table E.10. Results
excluding the Valentine’s experiment only were similar (available by request).
Result 1. Overall, the Before treatment increased the average amount donated relative to the After treatment.
Result 2. Overall, participants were more likely to give in the Before relative to the After treatment.
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 4 report the coefficients from a linear probability model for the incidence of giving
(logistic specifications lead to similar significance levels and estimated marginal effects; see table E.10 in the
appendix. Pooling across all experiments, the Before treatment has a significant impact on the extensive margin
response, whether or not we limit the sample to experiments with automatic deduction only, i.e. excluding the
Valentine’s experiment.
Revisiting our theoretical predictions, the greater giving in the Before versus After treatments is consistent
with both loss-aversion (under an expected-wealth or intermediate reference point, which immediately ad-
justs), confirming prediction 3 and with the signaling model (prediction 2.2). It is inconsistent with expected
utility over outcomes (prediction 1), with the standard affective mood argument (Prediction 8, or with loss-
aversion with a slowly-changing (or unchanging) reference point (prediction 7).
4.1 Robustness checks and quantile eects
To provide strong evidence that our results are robust and not driven by "p-hacking" (simonsohn2014p), in
appendix Table E.10 we report a matrix of results of reasonable alternative modeling choices over experiment
selection, outcomes, error structure, specification, and control variables.
Across these specifications, our results are significant at the p=.05 level or better in 155 of 169 regres-
sions. The notable exceptions are several Probit and Logit specifications on the pre-registered sample, with
controls and demeaned interactions, and with robust but not clustered standard errors; 7/9 of the regressions
in this category reported p-values above p = .05. However, with clustered standard errors, all of the comparable
regression coefficients of interest were strongly significant.
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Table 5. Quantile regressions on Donation shares (as percentages): For all experiments pooled; and for preregistered only
Panel A: Pooled Quantile
50 60 70 80 90
b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p
Before 3.200** 3.822* 8.398** 4.006 4.657*
[0.383,6.017] [-0.301,7.945] [1.798,14.998] [-1.942,9.954] [-0.515,9.830]
(1.436) (2.102) (3.364) (3.032) (2.637)
(0.026) (0.069) (0.013) (0.187) (0.078)
Observations 1363 1363 1363 1363 1363
Panel B: Prereg. Quantile
50 60 70 80 90
b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p
Before 7.310 14.620** 12.690* 14.620 14.620**
[-1.515,16.135] [2.321,26.919] [-1.139,26.519] [-6.561,35.801] [1.731,27.509]
(4.495) (6.264) (7.043) (10.788) (6.565)
(0.104) (0.020) (0.072) (0.176) (0.026)
Observations 700 700 700 700 700
Notes: This table reports coefficients, 95% confidence intervals, standard errors, and t-test p-values from quantile regressions of donations
as shares of the endowment; quantiles indicated at top. Panel A reports the results for pooled data over all experiments. Panel B for the
preregistered experiments. We exclude donations from the lower income level. All regressions include de-meaned dummy controls, as well
as the interactions of these with the Before treatment. The constant is not reported. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
In Table 5 we present quantile regression results, allowing us to infer the effects of the Before treatment on
the donation outcome distribution (but, as widely noted, this does not necessarily identify the "distribution of
the treatment effect"). For the pooled data, we find an increase for each of the 5th to 9th deciles, statistically
significant for all but the 8th), and the strongest effect on the 7th decile. (The 7th decile donation share is
14.2% of the endowment in the After treatment and 20% in the before treatment; see histogram in figure 5.)
4.2 Heterogeneity and nonlinearity of eects
Pooled data: Gender, age, religiosity. In Table E.7 in the appendix we report regressions with the Before
treatment interacted with key pre-determined observables.27 As we de-mean each of the binary interacted
terms, the base coefficient remains a consistent estimator of the average treatment effect, while the interaction
terms represent treatment effect differences between groups (see Athey et al., 2017).
Much previous work has found gender differences in the levels and determinants of other-regarding be-
havior, in their sensitivity to “price” and cost/benefit ratio (Andreoni, Vesterlund, 2001; Cox et al., 2006), in
their response to the time delay (Breman, 2011), and in their sensitivity to reporting, prestige, competition,
and previously-reported donations (Meier, 2007; Pan et al., 2011; Jingping, 2013; Jones et al., 2014). Women
in our experiments donate more than men in the After treatment, and the effect of the Before treatment is
somewhat smaller for women.
Overall, Table E.7 suggests substantial heterogeneity in treatment effects by age and gender, and these
interactions are sometimes significant.28 However, most categories with a higher baseline dummy (representing
a higher mean in the After treatment) have a negative interaction term, and vice-versa. When baseline outcome
27. Where missing, these variables are linearly imputed using other variables in this regression. The results (available by request)
are not sensitive to this imputation. The results are also similar when we introduce each interaction in isolation.
28. Note that the first three columns of these models include treatment-experiment interactions to avoid confounding heterogeneity
with differences in the range of demographics by experiment. These interactions are hidden to save space; several of these experiment-
treatment interactions are significant even after the demographic controls; details available by request. Note that the religiosity interaction
is not significant when we include experiment interactions and dummies. This weakly suggests that "magical thinking" is not driving our
result; however, the confidence intervals for this interaction are large, implying limited power to detect a difference.
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levels vary between groups, it is difficult to distinguish heterogeneity from nonlinear treatment effects. Our
evidence is also consistent with a smaller impact of the Before treatment for more generous individuals. This
may be explained by a steeply diminishing marginal utility of donations in this context. In the appendix Table
E.8 we provide results from a power model offering evidence of this nonlinear relationship. Table E.9 reveals
that the demographic interaction coefficients lose their significance in this nonlinear specification.29 This is
also consistent with the histogram (Figure 5), which suggests shifts from the smallest donations to medium
donations, but no shift towards the largest donations.
4.3 Further treatment comparisons and experiment-specic results
Happiness/aect, and donations. In the Prolific and Omnibus experiments, after (but not immediately after)
the prize determination and donation questions we elicited a standardmeasure of happiness; we report relevant
results in table E.5. Unsurprisingly, those who failed to win stated a significantly lower level of happiness
(about 3/4 of a standard deviation). However, it does not appear that this increased happiness is driving those
(winners) in the After treatment to donate more. In the Prolific experiment we also asked the same happiness
question near the beginning of the survey. We find a tightly bounded near-zero relationship between this
earlier happiness measure and the chosen donation; the 95% confidence interval is less than 1/4 of a standard
deviation.
Other lab treatments. Our laboratory design allowed a richer set of treatment comparisons. However, other
than the result discussed above (Before versus After) we find insignificant differences in giving from the higher
level of earnings between individual treatments, and the large variance in responses and the wide and overlap-
ping confidence intervals suggests a lack of statistical power to distinguish among these. We report on these
results in the appendix (Figure E.10 and Table E.11). Note that the Before treatment also yields greater dona-
tions than the Benchmark treatment (with no income or donation uncertainty), and our results are similar if
we pool the Before-both and Before treatments; further details available by request.
Probabilities ofwinning (Prolic). The Prolific experiment also included a Before treatment with a 10% chance
of winning. We find (Table 6) very strong effects of both Before treatments relative to the After treatment
(£0.96 in the 50% treatment and £0.60 in the 10% treatment, significant at the 1-percent and 5 percent
levels, respectively). The difference between these two Before treatments is not statistically significant, and
the confidence intervals reveal limited power to distinguish these.30
We control for two background variables—these come from Prolific screener" questions, which participants
are asked to answer when they first sign up for Prolific, and throughout the months and years they are regis-
tered. Thus, these were likely answered well in advance of our study, minimizing any possible contamination.
We see a near-zero relationship to de-meaned age. However, we find a strong correlation between giving in our
experiment and the participant’s response to the question "how much, if anything, did you donate to charity in
the last 12 months?"; this supports the relevance and generalizability of our results to external environments.
29. We also ran a two-step procedure (i) regressing giving on pre-determined observables and generating a prediction using After-
treatment data, and (ii) regressing giving in the Before treatment on this predicted value and demographics. Again the results (available
by request) are consistent with a diminishing-returns treatment effect, and show little evidence of direct heterogeneity by demographics.
30. Recall that the signaling model predicts that if a 50% realization of a donation choice yields a larger (good-type) commitment
than does an ex-post (100%) choice, a 10% probability of realization must lead to a donation that is still larger. Thus, to the extent that
we can rule out a substantially larger average donation in the Before-10 treatment relative to Before-50, this speaks against the signaling
model.
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Table 6. Prolific: Linear models of donation levels and incidence
Levels Incidence
(1) (2)
b/ci95/se/p b/ci95/se/p
Before 0.958*** 0.168**
[0.298,1.617] [0.014,0.322]
(0.335) (0.078)
(0.005) (0.032)
Before 10% -0.359 0.043
[-1.092,0.374] [-0.108,0.194]
(0.372) (0.076)
(0.336) (0.574)
Age (centered) 0.039 0.001
[-0.020,0.097] [-0.010,0.012]
(0.030) (0.006)
(0.192) (0.872)
Not previous donor (de-meaned) -1.037*** -0.337***
[-1.570,-0.504] [-0.481,-0.194]
(0.270) (0.073)
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.010*** 0.393***
[0.660,1.360] [0.284,0.502]
(0.178) (0.055)
(0.000) (0.000)
Before-10% summed 0.599 0.211
s.e. (0.295) (0.078)
Observations 230 230
Notes: This table reports coefficients, 95% confidence intervals, standard errors, and t-test p-values for regressions on donations by Treat-
ment for the Prolific experiment. Results exclude participants in the After treatment who did not win. The "Before" coefficient is the
impact of the Before-50% treatment, and "Before 10%" the adjustment to this impact for the Before-10% treatment. Regression controls
for Prolific background variables: age (de-meaned and imputed if missing) and self-reported non-giver; results are similar without con-
trols. Dependent variables are (1) the levels of donations in Euros (2) donation incidence. We report robust standard errors. Stars indicate
significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
Dynamic consistency and fulllment of pledges. As noted earlier, in the Valentine’s experiment, only 12 of
20 winners who pledged a donation followed this up by fulfilling it. However, in the Prolific experiment, which
allowed Before-winners to revise their donation choice, of the 30 who had pledged a positive amount, none
chose to reduce this after winning, and four chose to increase it. Furthermore, 2/19 of the Before-winners
who had not pledged chose to revise their decision to a positive amount. Considering these as a random draw
from a larger population, we can infer that there is less than a 5% probability that data as extreme as ours
would arise if 9.5% or more of the source population would cancel or reduce their donation (exact binomial
test, n= 30, K = 0).
Our evidence from the Prolific experiment suggests that a legally-binding pledge may not be necessary for
give-if-you-win to be a successful fundraising strategy. This finding is consistent with Breman’s (2011) field
experiment, in which very few donors deviated from their previously committed (increases in) contributions,
even though deviating only required a small effort. While this contrasts with Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016),
contextual differences suggest that our Before treatment, (relative to these authors’ Pledge treatment) was less
19
likely to induce donations from those with dynamically-inconsistent preferences, and those who donated faced
greater “moral pressure” not to renege and be inconsistent.31
4.4 Overall giving, implications for fundraising and policy
Fundraising organizations will primarily care about the overall effect on giving. In some contexts, it is rele-
vant to consider asking people to donate both in good and bad states. We might consider asking people for
conditional donations before the uncertain income is resolved, or asking them after this, whether or not they
are "winners." We have limited evidence on donations from the "losing" state, from laboratory and Valentine’s
experiments.
An alternate policy would be to ask people to make a commitment "if they win", and then ask them again
after (and if) they lose the lottery. The standard outcome-based expected utility model predicts that the former
ask (for one state) will have no impact on donations after another state has occured. This implies that dona-
tions in an "After-lose" state would be the same whether or not we already gave them the Before ask. Thus our
previously stated results would imply that this alternate policy would also raise more than asking After both
wins and losses. We have no evidence in this context on whether later asks are affected by earlier asks for unre-
alized states; however, a moral-licensing effect is suggested by the declining giving across rondomly-realized
stages in Reinstein, 2010 and Tonin et al., 2014).
We could also consider asking in advance for a complete contingent plan, or asking After for both winners
and losers. Here we have some evidence, but limited power to detect differences. As reported in appendix
D.3, earlier runs of the laboratory experiment included a Before-both treatment, where we asked subjects, in
advance, to make a donation choice for both winning and losing states). As noted, we also asked losers to
donate in the Laboratory and Valentine’s experiments. The regressions in table 7 consider the expected value
of the donation for the analogue each of the policies mentioned above.
Table 7. Linear models: Comparing expected amounts raised
Notes: Updated table in preparation, as requested by JPubE referee
4.5 Further alternative explanations
Participants may have non-standard beliefs about probabilities and randomness. In particular, they may believe
that their commitment to contribute will increase their likelihood of winning. This may stem from “magical
thinking”, an illusion of control (see seminal article by Langer, 1975, and the literature following it) or ex-
hibiting “just world beliefs” (Rubin et al., 1975). An individual who believes in Karma (cf. Levy et al., 2006)
may believe she will be rewarded for good acts (or good commitments) and punished for bad ones.32 While
we can not rule this out, we emphasize in each experiment that stochastic outcomes have been determined by
31. Andreoni, Serra-Garcia, 2016 found that nearly half of students who pledged to donate $5 in a "Pledge" treatment chose to renege
on this a week later. However, our experiments differed in important ways. We presented an opportunity to adjust the donation i. in either
direction, ii. after experiencing a win, iii. very soon after the initial commitment, iv. in the same environment as the initial commitment
and v. as a surprise—the initial commitment was not a tentative one. In contrast, Andreoni, Serra-Garcia, 2016’s initial "Pledge" was
worded softly ("Ask me again next week and I will make my final decision"), reneging (not increasing) was allowed a full week later, and
the week 1 (but not week 2) sessions were accompanied by a slide show read by the experimenter in support of the charity.
32. Participants may donate more before if they believe that a spiritual force affects their winning probabilities; but it is not clear
whether in the Before treatment she will give conditional or unconditionally. She may want to appease the gods by saying “I will donate
anyway,” or she may want to give them an incentive to make her a winner by making her donation conditional on a win. Similarly, she
may donate more After out of a sense of gratitude towards this spiritual force. (As this is difficult to pin down, we did not include it in the
table.)
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random draw prior to their donation choices. We also differentiate our results by measures of stated religious
affiliation, finding no significant differences (however, our sample yielded limited power to detect an effect).
Several other behavioral models and concerns could also predict donation behavior distinct from the standard
expected utility model, including adaptation, tangibility, present-bias, a status-quo reference point, and uncer-
tainty aversion. We discuss these in the online appendix, arguing that these are less relevant than the models
presented above, and are not supported by our evidence.
5 Conclusion
Our experiments are the first to document the effect of the resolution of income uncertainty on other-regarding
behavior, augmenting existing evidence that such behavior may not be well-explained by outcome-based ex-
pected utility theory. As noted, this also has an important implication for experimental methods: many exper-
iments used a “random problem selection mechanism” (Azrieli et al., 2012), selecting only a single decision
stage for payment, arguing that this ensures no feedback between stages. This may be violated: e.g., in a dic-
tator game, if an earlier stage’s incentives prompted a generous commitment, this might satiate the desire for
signaling and lead to lower commitments in later stages (as seen in Tonin et al., 2014 and Reinstein, 2010).
The implications for the strategy method (Selten, 1967) are similar; in making such decisions, subjects may
trade off the costs and benefits of signaling between contingencies.
We find higher donations and a greater propensity to commit to donate when individuals are asked to
conditionally commit before learning if they have won a prize or bonus, relative to those asked after they
have won. This result is statistically significant (p<.01) in pooled data and in three of five distinct contexts
(p<.01 for two contexts and p<.10 for one context) across several different populations (Essex students,
UK nonstudents, German students). The magnitude of this effect is within the range of effects estimated in
other charitable giving experiments (see appendix E.8). The effect is stronger for those groups predicted to
donate less in the After treatment. However, it may not carry over into every situation; in other environments
asking after a bonus may be more effective; perhaps affect/mood may dominate. Allowing for heterogeneous
motivations, the theory presented is ambiguous, suggesting that results may vary according to the environment.
Still, our evidence strongly suggests that in relevant environments contributions involving uncertain realization
and/or uncertain income do not follow the predictions of standard expected utility models.
Although our experiments are of a limited scale, they may be relevant to other forms of prizes, be they
from gambling, state lotteries, or workplace bonuses. Some sectors, most famously the financial sector, offer
substantial bonuses, the exact magnitude of which are often unclear ahead of time. Our findings suggest that
asking workers to commit to give a share of their bonus (or their “bonus in excess of a specified expectation”)
could be an effective revenue generator for charities. In many countries, including the USA, tax rebates at the
end of a fiscal year are both common and uncertain in magnitude, offering another potential application. In
general, policymakers could promote “windfall giving”, and help clarify the legal environment surrounding
commitments of uncertain income.
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Appendix
A Appendix: Theoretical Predictions; extensions and proofs
To isolate the drivers of potential differences in donations in the above settings, we consider donations from the
lower ("losing") income, which we label as ga
`
≥ 0, as well as the following additional environments. Individuals
in setting (D) face no uncertainty, as they know from the beginning whether they have a high or low income;
we label their donations gdw and g
d
`
, indexed by income. Those in setting U also have a definite income (w or
`), but their chosen donation (labelled guw or g
u
`
) will only be collected with probability p, and otherwise it
is returned to them. Finally, we considered a variation of the Before setting, where the individual makes two
donation choices before the uncertainty is resolved; one for low income (g bb
`
) and one for high income (g bbw ).
A.1 Expected Utility over outcomes
Consider an individual maximizing a Bernoulli utility function v(x , g), where x represents consumption and
g the charitable contribution, subject to non-negativity constraints and to the budget constraint x + g ≤ z;
Wealth or purchasing power (in a given state state of the world) is here denoted by z ∈ {w,`}.
Let us assume her utility satisfies the standard expected-utility properties, so that the utility of a prospect
is the probability-weighted sum of the utility of each element. Suppose she is asked to make a conditional
decision, choosing gw and g` before learning the realization of z. Assuming non-satiation, we can substitute in
the budget constraints and express her problem as
g bw, g
b
` := argmax
gw,g`
(1 − p)v(l − gl , gl) + pv(w − gw, gw),
where p is her probability of winning the prize. As explained in the main text, this characterizes the most
widely cited models of giving, including a warm glow model where, as we assume throughout, the warm
glow derives only from the amount actually donated. It is trivial to see that the same choices obtain when the
donation decision is made after any uncertainty about income has resolved, and for the Uncertain Collection
case. Thus, a standard model will predict gaz = g
b
z = g
d
z = g
u
z for z ∈ {w, l} or for any level of income. This
remains true for g bw, if, as in our field experiment and in setting B, we constrain g
b
l = 0. In other words, the
timing of the decision (i.e., whether it is a sure thing or a prospect), is irrelevant to the individual’s choice.
The full prediction:
gdw = g
a
w = g
b
w = g
bb
w = g
u
w and
gd` = g
a
` = g
bb
` = g
u
l
A.2 Signaling Model of Reputation with uncertain collection
We define an individual’s Bernoulli utility as an additively separable function:
v(x , g) = u(x) + θω(Dg) + R(φ), (1)
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where x is an individual’s own consumption, g is the amount committed to donate, and D is an indicator
variable taking the value one if the committed donation is collected, and zero otherwise. θω(·) is his in-
trinsic utility from donating, and θ ∈ {0,1} reflects his type, “bad” or “good”, respectively, drawn by nature
with pr(θ = 1) := µ∈ (0,1).33 The function u(·) represents the sub-utility of own-consumption, and ω(Dg)
represents his private benefit from actually giving Dg (akin to a warm-glow function, but equally repre-
senting the private benefit from augmenting a public good). R(φ) is his utility from his reputation, a func-
tion of φ, which represents the posterior probability he and others put on him being of type θ = 1, where
R(0)= 0, R(µ)= λr, R(1)= r; r> 0, 0≤ λ <≤1. Note that φ may depend on g−i and g in equilibrium, where
g−i is the vector of others’ committed contributions.34
As in Benabou et al. (2006), we consider a direct payoff from reputation (in a social or self-signaling
context, “which may be instrumental .. . or purely hedonic”). We focus now on the setting where the individual
faces income uncertainty and is asked about a contingent donation only for the state with high income, w. By
standard assumptions, she will maximize the expected value of this Bernoulli utility function subject to the
budget constraint
x + g ≤ z,
where z denotes wealth. As donation commitments are only made for one income level, we omit the income
superscript for g. The expected value of the utility can be restated as
Uθ (g) = u(l) + p[u(w − g) − u(l)] + pθω(g) + R(φ),
where p is the the probability (at the time the donation decision is made) that the income is w and the
donation will be collected. We consider equilibria where someone is assumed to be a potential good type only if
he donates some amount which we will define as g1. Note that in a separating equilibrium reputation benefits
are 0 for the bad types and r for good types. As we are only allowing positive donations (g ≥ 0 is an implied
constraint), it is trivial to show that in a separating equilibrium bad types donate nothing, i.e., g0 = 0, which
we assume henceforth. In a pooling equilibrium, everyone will get reputation benefit R(µ)= λr, i.e., some
share of the reputation benefit of being known to be a good type.35
Separating equilibrium: constraints. We next state the constraints for a separating equilibrium. The relevant
constraint of the good type is that
U1(g1) ¾ U1(g) ∀g. (2)
The relevant incentive compatibility condition of the bad type requires:
33. Our key insights generalize to a model in which types have continuous support, and the probability distribution may condition
on a set of observable variables including gender and previous actions, as long as some uncertainty remains.
34. Note that we are assuming he knows his own type θ at the point he makes his decision. To make this a model where self-signaling
is important, he must have limited memory of θ but better memory of past actions, as in Benabou et al. (2011). These authors write:
“This self-assessment or signal, however, may not be perfectly recalled or ‘accessible’ later on —in fact, there will be strong incentives to
remember it in a self-serving way. Actions, by contrast, are much easier to quantify, record and remember than their underlying motivation,
making it rational for an agent to define himself partly through his past choices .. .”
35. λ may depend on the actual share of good types in the population, but this will not affect our results unless we are comparing
across distinct populations.
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U0(0) ¾ U0(g1). (3)
Let g∗ represent a good type’s preferred donation net of reputation, i.e.36
g∗ = argmax
g
{u(w − g) + ω(g)}.
Solutions .
Case 1 . Suppose at g∗ the bad type will not deviate even if that brings him reputation benefit r, i.e.,
suppose
−p[u(w − g∗) − u(w)] ≥ r. (4)
Then, in the separating equilibrium with the lowest level of contributions (which is also the one that max-
imizes welfare for the good type, and the only one satisfying the intuitive criterion), g1 = g∗, independent
of p. The bad type’s incentive constraint does not bind in this case, while the good type chooses her warm-
glow maximizing donation level, satisfying condition 2. Note that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium here.
Summing up, for the intuitive equilibrium in this parameter space, conditional donations do not change in
the probability that they are collected; hence the intuitive criterion predicts that the expected donation will
increase in p. Conversely, the expected contribution will decrease as p decreases up until the point at which
Condition 4 no longer holds, i.e., up to the point where the collection probability is low enough to tempt bad
types to imitate the good types.
Case 2 . Suppose condition 4 fails, i.e, −p[u(w− g∗)− u(w)]< r.
Thus if g1 ≤ g∗ the bad type would have an incentive to deviate and donate, i.e., the IC constraint is
binding for bad types. Thus g1 = g∗ cannot be part of equilibrium play. There are multiple separating equilibria.
Consider the separating equilibrium with the lowest level of contributions, which is the only equilibrium that
will survive the intuitive criterion. Here, a good type’s contribution gmin1 solves:
−p[u(w − gmin1 ) − u(w)] = r. (5)
In this case, if the collection probability p decreases, the minimum level of conditional donations that
separates types (gmin1 ) increases.
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Summarizing Cases 1 and 2. Thus, beginning at a value of p where the separation constraint does not
bind, i.e., (4) holds with inequality, reducing p a small amount has no effect on conditional donations (g1 =g∗)
but lowers expected donations (pg∗). Reducing it further causes (4) to no longer hold, but permits only an
36. Note that, excluding reputation, the probability of collection does not matter for the optimal decision here.
37. We may also have pooling equilibria where both types contribute gpool satisfying g∗ ≤ gpool < gmin1 . These are possible where
bad types are willing to contribute g∗ even to gain the lower reputation R˜(gpool |pooling). I.e.,
−p[u(w − g∗) − u(w)] < λr < r, (6)
where the latter inequality is given to highlight that a pooling equilibrium could be ruled out under a weaker condition than condition 4.
For lower values of p this equation holds for a wider range of preferences. However, the pooling equilibrium also does not survive the
intuitive criterion. There is always a deviation that is only profitable for the good type, as he enjoys not only the reputational gain (1−λ)r
but also, unlike the bad type, a warm glow.
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intuitive separating equilibrium where h’s donate gmin1 > g
∗. Further reducing p increases gmin1 but lowers the
probability the contribution is realized.38
The analysis extends to situations where income is not uncertain but the collection of donations is (by
interpreting the collection probability as p and setting both w and ` to the realised income).
We can now compare across settings. For illustration—and resembling our lab experiment—assume that
the probability of winning in the Before and After settings, and the probability the donation is collected in the
Uncertain Collection setting are all p = 1/2. Suppose that the reputational benefit is such that case 2 applies
for p = 1/2 while case 1 obtains if p = 1. This would imply that in the Before and Uncertain Collection setting
good types will commit to donate gu = gmin1 > g
∗. In the After setting (with the same income) corresponding
to p = 1, good types will donate ga = g∗ < gmin1 . Alternately, suppose case 2 held for both p = 1 and p = 1/2.
Here donations in the After setting would be above g∗, but still below gmin1 , the commitment in the settings
Before and Uncertain Collection.
Summarizing the above, where parameters are consistent with case 2 (under the Before or Uncertain Col-
lection settings) this model yields Prediction 5.
Prediction 5. Signaling generosity, where the separation constraint binds
guw = g
b
w > g
d
w = g
a
w
for good types, while bad types are unaffected by the treatment. A similar relationship will hold for donations from
the lower level of income if condition 4 also fails at income ` , which need not be the case.39
A similar relationship will hold for donations from the lower level of income if the separation constraint
binds (i.e., condition 4 fails) at `, which need not be the case. Under the standard assumption that u(·) is
concave, the parameter space where this holds at income ` is a proper subset of the parameter space where
this holds at income w.
Note the arguments above do not automatically carry over to the Before Both setting: if the reputation takes
into account both types of conditional donations, then a bad type who donates only conditional on winning
would fully reveal his type. Here, we do not make explicit predictions for this setting.
B Appendix: Alternative models
B.1 Koszegi-Rabin Preferred Personal Equilibrium model
Prediction 3 does not extend to the Koszegi et al. (2006) preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) model. In a PPE
for the After-win case, (even assuming the reference point forms after the lottery) the donor does not "give from
gains"; the personal equilibrium anticipates her donation, and the standard utility-maximizing bundle yields a
preferred personal equilibrium. Similarly, in the Before setting the same standard expected-utility maximizing
choice yields a PPE. Thus, a straightforward application of the PPE model predicts g bw = g
a
w. We demonstrate
this below.
38. The net effect on expected contributions pgmin1 depends on the concavity of the material sub-utility function u(·) We have
−p dgmin1dp = u(w)−u(w−g
min
1 )
u′(w−gmin1 )
≥ gmin1 (where the latter inequality follows iff u is convex), implying d(pg
min
1 (p))
dp ≤ 0 if and only if u is con-
vex. Thus, under a standard assumption of diminishing returns to own-consumption (concave u(·)), lowering p will reduce expected
contributions.
39. Under the standard assumption that u(·) is concave, the parameter space where this holds at income w is a proper subset of the
parameter space where this holds at income l.
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Consider the PPE model, with the two dimensions consumption income (c1) and donation c2. In line with
their model, denote the standard utility by:
m(c) = m1(c1) + m2(c2) = u(c1) + ω(c2)
and assume, for the gain-loss component, µ(x)= ηx if x ≥> 0 and µ(x)= ηληx if x < 0 so that utility given
reference point r becomes:
u(c1, c2|r1, r2) = u(c1) + ω(c2) + µ(u(c1) − u(r1)) + µ(ω(c2) − ω(r2)).
Consider the After-win context. Assume that the decisionmaker forms a reference point after she has learned
if her income is w or `. By proposition 3 in Koszegi-Rabin, with respect to the preferred personal equilibrium
(PPE) the utility maximizing donation level is the one that maximizes standard utility:
u(w − g) + ω(g).
Thus, the PPE model suggests that loss-aversion has no effect on the After donation. Denote the solution by gaw,
from FOC: −u′(w− gaw)=ω′(gaw).
Consider now the Before case. Here one might apply the model by assuming that the decision maker forms
reference lotteries before she knows her income. We investigate now if setting the same donation, i.e., g bw =
gaw remains a personal equilibrium (PE). (If so, it is also a PPE as it maximises ex ante EU.) To specify the
conjectured equilibrium reference point lottery, notice that donating gaw contingent on winning implies that
with probability p the consumption component c1 and hence r1 is w− gaw, and the donation component c2,
hence r2, is g
a
w. With probability (1-p) the consumption component is ` and the donation component is zero
(recall we are considering the Before treatment, where the donation is solicited for only the winning state).
Given this reference lottery, we now evaluate possible deviations from the equilibrium with respect to the
donation (pertaining to the high income, of course). The utility of donating any g conditional on winning with
reference points corresponding to gaw is (given there is no choice in the low-income state):
(1 − p)[u(l) + pηλ(u(l) − u(w − gaw) + ω(0) − ω(gaw)] + p(u(w − g) + ω(g)) + p
(1 − p)ηλ(u(w − g) − u(l) + ω(g) − ω(0)]], if g = gaw
[pγ[u(w − g) − u(w − gaw) + λ(ω(g) − ω(gaw)) + (1 − p)γ(u(w − g) − u(l) + ω(g) − ω(0)]], if g ≤ gaw
[pγ[λ(u(w − g) − u(w − gaw)) + ω(g) − ω(gaw) + (1 − p)γ(u(w − g) − u(l) + ω(g) − ω(0)]], if g ≥ gaw
Interpretating the first line: If I get low income, in addition to normal utility I feel a loss relative to the high
-state (with has probability p) in both dimensions.
Interpreting the second line: If I get high income I will feel a gain relative to low income in both dimensions
(unless g bw exceeds the difference in incomes). If I donate more than planned, I will have a loss in own con-
sumption (but a gain in warm-glow). If I donate less, I experience a gain in own-income and a loss in donation
income.
Intuition: Since the loss will always weigh more strongly than an equivalent gain, and g is optimally chosen
w.r.t normal utility, deviations are not profitable.
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This means that at g = gaw the right derivative (higher g) is proportional to −λu′(w− gaw)+ω′(gaw)< 0
while the left derivative (lower g) is proportional to −u′(w− gaw)+λω′(gaw)> 0, so that indeed gaw remains
optimal.
Additionally note that equilibrium condition of the PPE model entails that if a decision maker forms a plan
(in the context of determining the reference lottery), he will follow it through even if she is given opportunity
to revise it later.
Finally, we note that the weaker concept of personal equilibrium instead of the preferred personal equilibrium
may yield a larger range of predictions.
B.2 Tangibility
If uncertain winnings are less “tangible” than the same winnings after the uncertainty has been resolved this
might also explain the patterns we see in the field experiment. There is abundant evidence for different mental
accounting over different types of earnings or wealth. Several economists have found that subjects who play
with standard laboratory “endowments” make less self-interested choices than when they use money they
have either “earned” through a laboratory task or brought from outside the lab (Cherry et al., 2002; Hoffman,
Spitzer, 1985; Burrows et al., 1994).
Reinstein, Riener, 2012a note that “people may treat money they are promised (or are given in the form
of tokens) differently than cash they physically hold—we call this the tangibility effect, and find significant
evidence from a laboratory charitable giving experiment supporting this. Along similar lines, Oberholzer-Gee
et al., 2004 argue that subjects do not fully consider the opportunity costs of the funds they give away in
experiments. Breman, 2011, offers field experimental evidence that people are more generous in making com-
mitments to charity with future income rather than present income. None of these experiments document com-
mitments made with truly uncertain income, but to the extent to which all of these endowments are broadly
less tangible, these make a similar case.
In our experimental context, the predictions of the Tangibility model are the same as under Loss Aversion
with a status-quo reference point. Both of these predict more giving in the Before Both treatment from low
income relative to the Benchmark with the same income; we do not observe this. Neither of these predict the
response to the Uncertainty treatment that we observe for males.
B.3 Uncertainty aversion (ambiguity)
Risk aversion, as explained by diminishing returns to consumption, will not predict any difference in donations
between our treatments. However, if we assume (i) people inherently value uncertain and unallocated income
(i.e., income that can be used for later choices, including consumption or charitable giving), less than certain
unallocated income; and (ii) value uncertain committed donations as much as certain committed donations,
then this may predict a greater willingness to commit from a gain (ex-ante). By “value uncertain income
less,” we mean that, ex-ante, the marginal utility of an additional unit of unallocated income that occurs with
probability p is valued at less than p times the utility of the additional unit of unallocated income.
Intuitively, contributing from a gain reduces expected personal consumption, but it also reduces the uncer-
tainty over this consumption. Giving up income solely to reduce uncertainty might never be valued in itself
(although this might be predicted by “direct risk aversion”, Simonsohn, 2009) but it may induce greater do-
nations where there is also some additional from committing to make a donation. If the uncertainty is also
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“Knightian”, i.e., ambiguous, committing to contribute from the gain state will also reduce the magnitude of
this ambiguity.
B.4 Adaptation, habituation, relativity with complementarity
A simple model of rapid unanticipated adaptation/habituation (Helson, 1964) to the prize money in the pres-
ence of anticipated complementarity of happiness (or perceived wealth) and generosity should predict a greater
conditional commitment before winning than the donation if asked after. Intuitively, people believe that con-
tributing yields a greater marginal utility when they are feeling happier ormore wealthy. They also overestimate
how happy or wealthy the prize will make them feel40—thus, they would commit to contribute generously. On
the other hand, individuals who win the prize quickly adapt to having won the prize and their happiness may
be extremely short lived. If asked to donate even a few moments after they learn that they have won, they
see themselves as “of average happiness” or “moderately well off”, and they donate less they committed in the
conditional Before environment.
In our experimental context, the predictions of the Adaptation model are the same as under Loss Aversion
with an expected income reference point, where the reference point does not adjust within the relevant time
period. However, we do not expect this motive to play a strong role in our experiment, as the adaptation
typically discussed occurs over a much longer interval. However, this may be relevant in some of the real-world
contexts we discuss.
C Appendix: Modeling heterogeneity
This model can be extended to reflect signaling where individuals can be publicly identified by a certain char-
acteristic, e.g., gender, and the groups are known to have different type distributions and utility parameters.
If we allow all the individual parameters in Equation 1 to differ by the group’s observable characteristic, case
(1) is more “likely” to hold for groups with a smaller reputation motive (smaller r) relative to the warm glow
term (of good types in that group). I.e., as r declines the parameters move towards case 1 above, and if R(·)
is not present the results are as in the expected utility model. Thus, under some background environments
case (1) may hold for one group, e.g., women, while case (2) may hold for another group and the donation
commitments will respond to the uncertain collection for the latter group only.41
C.1 Loss Aversion and Reference Points
When making—even riskless—choices, it is often argued that decisions are influenced by anticipated gains
and losses relative to a reference point (see Tversky et al., 1991). Thaler et al. (2004) claim “... once house-
holds get used to a particular level of disposable income, they tend to view reductions in that level as a loss.”
In considering this model, we suppose the individual has a reference point over her own consumption, not in-
cluding charitable giving, and her utility function sums a standard reference-independent term and a gain-loss
component. Her donation decision, whether stochastic or certain, anticipates how the donation will reduce the
remaining wealth available for her own consumption. If this will fall below her reference point, she will incur
a psychological loss. We assume there is no gain-loss utility over the donation itself (i.e., a single target, as in
40. There is extensive evidence suggesting that people overestimate the effect of good and events on their happiness; see
loewenstein1999wouldn for a survey.
41. Note that if a greater share of one group are good types, perhaps implying a larger λ, this will only affect the conditions for a
pooling equilibrium but will not affect our conditions for cases 1 and 2.
31
Camerer et al., 1997).42 While the reference point may change over time, we assume here that she is myopic
in the sense that when making a decision she does not anticipate these changes. For simplicity, we consider a
utility function embodying a linear loss function, i.e.,
v(x , g,pi) =
(
u(x) + ω(Dg) if x ≥ pi
u(x) − δ[u(pi) − u(x)] + ω(Dg) if x < pi;
subject to the budget constraint x + g ≤ E.
As before x represents own consumption, g is the committed donation expenditure and D indicates whether
it is realized, pi is a reference point, specified below, and δ is a (strictly) positive constant. Here u(·), the sub-
utility of own-consumption, is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, as is the “warm glow” function
ω(·). We consider two different ways this reference point may update to the realization of uncertainty. First,
we consider immediate adjustment, second, we consider a very sticky adjustment process.43 To save space, all
of these derivations are in the online appendix (“Loss aversion models”).
Suppose the reference point always corresponds to the expected future income at the point of the decision,
the maximum own-consumption one could achieve if one’s investments paid their expected value. This implies
that contributions incur a loss in all cases expect for conditional contributions from an expected win, implying
greater contributions in the Before than in the other treatments, i.e.:
Prediction 6. Loss Aversion, expected income, immediate adjustment
g bw > gw = g
a
w = g
u
w (provided g
b
w < w − (pw + (1 − p)l)) and
g` = g
a
` .
Robustness to intermediate reference points (with adjustment)
The analysis above generalizes to any intermediate reference point. Suppose it always satisfies pi : `≤ pi < w
in the Before treatment, while it is given by ` or w in the other treatments. If w− gw > pi, for high income,
there will be higher donations in the Before treatments (g bw>gw) than in the After or Benchmark treatments.
The lower is pi, the larger the set of preferences over which w− gw > pi will hold. For the “minimum income”
reference point pi= `, g bw>gw as long as the individual prefers to choose a positive level of consumption under
certain income w.
pi < ` implies that the individual’s reference point is below the lowest possible outcome. pi= 0 might be
interpreted as a “status quo” reference point if the individual does not count any unresolved income in her
reference point. However, this would seem paradoxical, as only part of the income (w− `) is unresolved, and
the income ` can be seen as certain. One might argue that until income is held “in hand” it is less tangible
42. This may hold if donating nothing and using all of one’s income for own-consumption is typically seen as the default, thus the
basis for a reference point. Note that this model’s predictions would be qualitatively the same if there were two targets, but the gain-loss
utility were far more salient for consumption targets than for giving targets.
43. We can consider the “ask,” even a fairly neutral ask, as a special shock motivating giving by changing the environment/context
or temporarily adjusting the utility function to make the utility slope of giving particularly steep (via alleviating guilt or providing special
warm glow); see Andreoni, Rao (2011) and models in Reinstein (2011) and Kotzebue et al. (2009). Hence we may predict individuals
will give a larger share of their “winnings” when asked in our experiments than the share of their income they might normally donate. The
reference consumption basket might be based on her expectations before being asked to donate, thus deducting no donation; alternately,
it may have anticipated a small probability of an ask, or it might immediately subtract the expected value of the conditional donation after
the ask. For any of these the reference consumption is still less than the higher earnings w.
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and thus easier to part with (see Reinstein, Riener, 2012a, on this point). However, in the experiments of the
present paper, it is hard to see how the base income ` in the Before treatments is less tangible than the income
in the Benchmark and After treatments; both are promises on a computer screen.
Loss averse: Expected income, no adjustment
Here we modify the above and assume that subjects’ reference point corresponds to the original expected value
income throughout the relevant decision period, and obtain a slightly different prediction. With this modifica-
tion, Benchmark donations are unaffected, while the After levels will now correspond to the aforementioned
Before levels, as they have the same reference points. This is summarized below.
Prediction 7. Loss Aversion, expected income, no adjustment
g bw = g
a
w > gw = g
u
w and
ga` < g`.
If the reference point does not adjust rapidly, then donations from an anticipated or actual win (loss) will
be higher (lower) than donations from income that was not subject to uncertainty.
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C.2 Aect
We continue the discussion from section 2.4.
Putting this together we might predict greater generosity after a prize has been won, relative to before the
prize outcome is known, and relative to a certain income. We might also predict lower generosity after failing
to win the prize relative to after a certain income (although the “negative state relief” model of Cialdini et al.,
1973, predicts the reverse). If individuals in the Before setting do not anticipate their change in mood from
winning or losing, and if neither non-random earnings nor facing a lottery directly affects mood, then (ignoring
other effects) the conditional commitments in the Before setting will equal the Benchmark donations for the
corresponding income levels.44
Prediction 8. Affective state
gaw > g
d
w = g
b
w = g
bb
w , g
a
` < g
d
` = g
=
` g
bb
`
D Appendix: Further experimental descriptions and details
D.1 Project chronology, explanation
Our first experiment was pooled with a Valentine’s card site; this was done both to provide a context that
distracted participants from considering the purpose of the experiment, and also to test hypotheses surrounding
"fear of losing face" (Gall and Reinstein, 2017). As seen above, the results from this experiment was strongly
significant; the before treatment led to substantially higher commitments. However, some questions remained
about the sincerity of these commitments; as noted above, many participants did not fulfill their pledges.
We next sought to garner evidence in a context where the commitments were binding, and thus the sincerity
could not reasonably be doubted. This led to our Employability experiment. The pairing with the employability
arms provided a distraction, but it also provided an additional source of funds for this experiment (as this
was a university priority), and an opportunity to test the impact of employability reminders on later career
performance (we have not had the opportunity to follow up on the latter). Here we found no strong overall
effect of the treatment itself, but we found a strong effect for males, and a strong gender difference. However,
we were concerned that this reflected the inherent biases from multiple hypothesis testing, and we looked for
further evidence explicitly testing for a gender difference.
Over nearly the same time period as Employability, we planned the laboratory experiments (in Germany).
As noted, these were designed with subtler treatments to test for mechanisms behind an observed difference
between Before and After treatments. We also planned these to provide confirmatory tests/replications of our
gender differential. However, in these experiments we did not find a gender differential, but we did find a
baseline difference which was marginally statistically significant (p<0.10), as reported above.
At this point we reviewed our evidence and realized that we did not have strong power overall to detect an
effect of what might be deemed a reasonable size, considering the magnitude of effects reported in previous
publications. Furthermore, we were concerned that without having drawn a line in the sand, our results might
be seen as ex post "just so" stories. Finally, we wanted to gain evidence from a relevant nonstudent population.
We decided to take a more systematic approach. We planned and designed an experiment which we registered
44. Similar predictions could arise out of an (indirect) reciprocity model (see Simpson et al., 2008), e.g., if the lottery’s sponsor were
the charity itself, or were believed to be sympathetic to the charity; the reciprocity motive would also have to depend on the realization
of the “gift” and not only its probabilistic implementation.
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on the AEA RCT registry. In this registration we carefully describe the experiment, its goals, and the targeted
sample size. As requested on this site, we noted our power calculations (estimating aminimum detectable effect
size). We also registered a pre-analysis plan, specifying the hypotheses we intended to test and the nature of
the statistical tests we planned to use.
We worked with the EssexLab to purchase a database of local nonstudent residents, to help them recruit
this group to the lab. We also work with them to build an omnibus survey, to be given to all members of the
laboratory subject pool. Again, this provided us a context as well as a source of some of the funds used for our
incentives/endowments.
However, as noted in the pre-analysis plan, we decided to prioritize using the non-student participants for
different experiment, and as the nonstudent response was smaller than expected, we did not have large enough
numbers to also test "give-if-you-win" on the sample. Thus the Omnibus responses we report are for students
only. However, because of the limited response rate and lack of nonstudents we decided it would be consistent
with the spirit of our earlier preregistered plan to run further "give-if-you-win" experiments on the Prolific
nonstudent sample. Thus, we subsequently recorded this change in our preregistration, and before running
the Prolific experiment, we added this to the preregistration and pre-analysis plan.
D.2 Prolic, additional screenshots
Figure D.0. Prolific entry page
D.3 Lab experiment
As noted above, the laboratory environment permits more control and a wider variety of treatments. The
design is shown in Table D.1.45 Subjects were seated at computer terminals and given a code number. They
next performed a Raven’s matrix task—a language-free multiple choice intelligence test—lasting about half an
hour (Raven, 1936); this aimed to give the endowment the flavor of earned income, rather than a windfall or
house money. Subjects were told they would be rewarded €7 for this (or €14 in more than half of the Benchmark
45. In the first wave of lab experiments we also included a “Before Both” treatment. Results are not sensitive to this: Table E.11 shows
this treatment had similar effects as Before; further results are available upon request.
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Table D.1. Laboratory - Experimental design
Certain treatments Probabilistic treatments
Treatment Benchmark After Before
Income Known Bonus lottery Bonus lottery
Donation Certain Certain Probabilistic
Stage
0 Real-effort Task Task Task
1 Learn income €7 or €14 €7 €7
2 Bonus info No info Possible €7 bonus Possible €7 bonus
3 Message 1 Reminded Learn bonus None
flat-rate income outcome (w or l)
4 Giving decision Giving decision Giving decision Giving decision
5 Message 2 None None Learn bonus outcome (w or l)
6 Belief elicitation and questionnaire
and Uncertain Collection treatments) independently of their performance. Next, the Benchmark and Uncertain
subjects were reminded of their earnings, and the rest were told “with a probability of 50 percent you will be
rewarded a bonus of €7 on top of your already acquired income of €7.”46
We took steps to demonstrate to the subjects that neither their performance nor their donation choices
could affect their chances of winning. Each was given a printed code and pointed to a sealed envelope pinned
to the inside of the laboratory door. They were told that the code would determine the "random" outcomes,
and that they could check this against the sheet at the end of the experiment. This measure aimed both to
rule out a direct material incentive to donate and to reduce the influence of magical thinking for subjects who
believe that “karma” can influence future but not predetermined events.
Before Those in the Before treatment were given a chance to conditionally donate, before learning if they won
the bonus, with the text (translated from German):
In case of you winning the bonus of € 7, we now want to give you the opportunity to donate a part of the income you
have earned in this experiment to a charitable organization. In doing so, you can choose between “Brot fur die Welt”
(Bread for the World) and the “World Wildlife Fund (WWF)”. [.. .] Please enter the amount of your donation in case of
you winning the bonus (amount can be between € 0 and € 14). In case of you not winning the bonus, nothing will be
deducted from your income and the organization will not receive a donation [...]
Before Both Before Both was identical to the Before treatment, except that subjects were asked, on the same
screen, to choose a donation both for the case of their winning the bonus, and for the case of their not
winning the bonus.
After After treatment subjects were first informed whether they received the bonus and then were given the
opportunity to donate to the above organizations, with similar language as above.
Benchmark Benchmark subjects were also asked to donate from their (known) income, with virtually identical
language as for the After subjects.
46. For those whose income was deterministic (Benchmark and Uncertain) and never expressed as a probability, we assigned more
than half to the higher income. This allowed us greater power to distinguish between treatments from donation commitments from €14.
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Uncertain Collection Uncertain subjects were told that with a probability of 50% they would have the oppor-
tunity to donate, and asked to enter a donation “in case of you being able to donate.”
All subjects were told “we will increase your donation by an additional 25 percent taken out of our own
budget.” Following the donation decision, we asked the subjects to make a series of incentivized and hypotheti-
cal predictions, followed by survey questions.47 Finally, we revealed net earnings, and revealed to the Uncertain
Collection subjects whether their donations would be collected. We opened the sealed envelope to demonstrate
that the random draws had indeed been pre-determined. Payments were made and donations passed to the
charities, with a subject monitor, as promised.
These experiments were run in Düsseldorf and Mannheim on a standard experimental subject pool (recruit-
ment was conducted via ORSEE; Greiner, 2004), using virtually identical protocols and zTree code at each lab
(Fischbacher, 2007). We ran nine sessions over five days in January–February 2013 and November 2014, and
24 sessions over 7 days in March–April 2016. A complete set of relevant screen shots and translations are
available in our online appendix.
To protect anonymity, we were careful to ensure that lab subjects never learned each other’s earnings or
contributions, and we never connected an individual’s identity to her treatment or her choices. Still, as noted
in the introduction, we cannot rule out a signalling motive. In making payments, we (the experimenters) could
infer how much each subject earned, which would have allowed us to make a probabilistic inference about
her likely contribution. Subjects may have anticipated this, implying a possible “signaling to the experimenter”
motivation. Furthermore, subjects may want to discuss their lab experience with others afterward. If it is
common-knowledge that lying brings a strong internal moral cost, reported choices may hold a similar signaling
power as actual verifiable choices. Finally, previous work suggests that subjects often bring real-world norms
and heuristics into the laboratory (e.g. Burns, 1985; Hoffman, McCabe, et al., 1996).
D.4 Screen shots and further material
Further screen shots for all experiments available by request; viewable copy of Qualtrics survey instruments
hosted online (see footnotes in main text). Additional screenshots, translations, and recruitment material is
given in the external links and files described in section F.
47. We first asked them to predict for what others donated; subjects were informed that they would be given €0.50 per answer that
was within €1 of the correct answer. First, they were asked guess the average overall donation. We next told them the two possible earnings
asked them to guess the average contribution from each level of earnings. Finally, we asked them a hypothetical question: what would
their own donations have been had they earned the other income/bonus amount? Details of this part of the design, the incentives, and the
results, are available by request. [Note to referee: included in supplemental materials submitted] These results are largely of independent
interest, and not strongly related to the main question of this paper.
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Before
After
Figure D.1. Employability experiment screenshots
D.5 Valentine’s experiment
In 2012 we ran an experiment tied to a St. Valentine’s Day E-card web site accessible at three UK universities
(Bristol, Essex, andWarwick). This was also advertised as a fundraiser for Right-to-Play, a popular international
charity which had been endorsed by the Essex Student Union. Students and staff who completed a survey were
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randomly selected to win restaurant vouchers and were given the opportunity to donate from this voucher. The
site was promoted through extensive flyering, postering, email lists to members of university organizations,
and online media, including Facebook and Twitter. We offered a lottery for restaurant vouchers (worth roughly
£20-30) as a participation incentive; participants were told the total number of restaurant vouchers to be given
away, but not the exact chances of winning.48
We implemented two treatments, which we will refer to as Before and After, which were assigned orthog-
onally to other subtle design variations in earlier parts of the Valentine’s promotion.49 Individuals in both
treatments were directed to a website informing them that the draw had taken place (so they had already won
or lost, though they did not know which).
Before In the Before treatment, participants were provided with information about the charity Right-to-Play
and asked whether they were willing to donate £1 or more. After making their decision, they proceeded
to a page letting them know if they had won. For winners this read “Congratulations you have WON the
free dinner for two at [Restaurant name] (value [£30/£20/£20 at Warwick/Bristol/Essex respectively]).
Please continue to learn how to claim your prize. For losers this read “Sorry, you have not won”. Proceeding
to the next page, those in the Before treatment received further instructions about how to claim their prize
and how to fulfill their pledge.
After In the After treatment, participants were first directed to the page where they were informed whether
they won. They were then asked to pledge to donate before learning how to claim their prize.
In this experiment pledges to donate were not binding; a donor had to follow through on her pledge by
donating online, at the Student Union office, or at the restaurant itself. However, many did not fulfill their
pledges; while 20 students owed a donation, our most inclusive measure suggests that only 12 of these made
any sort of donation. In light of this, there are reasonable interpretations of these results, including:
(I.1) Students in both treatments may have pledged sincerely, and forgotten (and not seen our reminder
emails) or found it too effortful to fulfill their small contributions.
(I.2) The Before treatment led to additional sincere pledges. However, at the point they were asked to fulfill
their contribution, their income was certain and tangible, resembling the After treatment. This may have
discouraged students from donating in spite of the disutility of cognitive inconsistency.
(I.3) Many Before pledgers never intended to fulfill their commitments; pledges may have been driven by
magical thinking, a desire to please the experimenters, or simply carelessness.
Under I.1, Before would raise more than After if fulfillment were made easier. Similarly, Before would raise
more under I.1 or I.2 with automatic deduction from prizes. However, under I.3, Before pledges (hence dona-
tions) under automatic deduction would fall to the level of After pledges.
Our evidence from the Prolific experiment—0/30 participants who could have lowered their contributions
did so—suggests that I.3 is unlikely. However, as these contexts differed, the choices might have involved a
48. We advertised 75, 25, and 10 restaurant vouchers worth £20, £20, or £30 each at Essex, Bristol, and Warwick, respectively. The
actual probabilities (ignoring the few who did not log in to check their prizes) were approximately 82% (75/92) at Essex, 32% (25/77)
at Bristol, and 28% (10/36) at Warwick. The precise language (at Essex): “Here you have the opportunity to send Valentine’s day E-cards
to anyone with an Essex email. Just by logging in and completing the survey, you will get a coupon for 20% off at Naka Thai, and be
entered into the draw to win one of 75 vouchers worth £20 for dinner at Naka Thai (on East Hill in Colchester). You do not have to send
any E-cards.” Again, a set of relevant screenshots is available in the online appendix.
49. In the earlier part, we varied whether a student’s identity and her donation (from a prior donation request) would be revealed
to the Valentine’s e-card recipient(s).
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different calculus. Still, our pooled results excluding the Valentine’s experiment are similar (see previous version
of working-paper).50
D.6 Employability
Our “Employability” field experiment was run in 2013/14 in the context of a promotion funded and announced
by the University of Essex Faculty of Social Sciences.51 Participants could win either a £20 Amazon or a £20
dinner voucher. Participants knew the (25%) probability of winning. Participants were informed “[.. .] your
donation will be automatically deducted from your prize and passed on to the charity of your choice, plus an
additional 10% from our own funds [.. .].”
Eligible undergraduate students were sent a series of emails, mainly from the departmental administrators,
encouraging them to participate, with text such as the following.
Subject: Employability promotion—a 1 in 4 chance of winning a £20 prize for doing a short survey.
Text: Please go to [SITE]—we have 80 free dinners for two in Colchester to give away, worth £20 each and
at least 40 £20 Amazon vouchers!! If you log on, you will have a one in four overall chance of winning one of
these prizes!
This was also promoted through extensive flyering, postering, university web sites, and social media. We
obtained 352 valid responses that involved a donation choice. No students were allowed to participate more
than once. Participants first signed in with their email, department, and study year. Half were then asked to
sign up for a job site (JobsOnline) and enter two jobs of interest to them.52 Next, they were informed of which
prize they had a 25% chance of winning (the prize selection was orthogonal to other treatments). After this
they were presented our Before or After donation treatment (screenshots in appendix Figure D.1).
We offered a 10%matching contribution for all donations, and donations were publicly made and recorded
on JustGiving, either anonymously or with a message, as the participant wished. We took these steps to offer
an incentive to donate within the experiment and increase the baseline level of donations, and to reflect typical
fundraising campaigns, which often involve matches and social incentives.53
50. Additional features specific to the Valentine’s experiment: 1. All were asked whether they were willing to donate £1 or more.
This aimed to increase the baseline rate of positive donation and enhance the experiment’s power by legitimizing low-value contributions
(see Weyant, 1978). 2. Losers were also asked if they wanted to donate (but 0/47 did so). 3. Losers at Essex were still given a small
“prize”, a 20% discount at Naka Thai. 4. We did not offer a matching contribution. 5. We provided a link for participants to verify the total
contribution made. 6. There was only a single charity involved.
51. This faculty included Economics, Government, Sociology, Language and Linguistics departments, the Center for Psychoanalytic
Studies, and later the Essex Business School. The first run was 4 June 2013 – 21 January 2014. Eligible students were in their first and
second years through October 2013, and in their second and third (final) years in following academic year. The next run was 14 May–25
July 2014. We began with this same set of departments (excluding participants in the previous run), and ultimately expanded eligibility
to all undergraduate students at the University of Essex, in order to use all of the prizes before our institutional deadline. The online
appendix provides further practical details and a timeline.
52. This was one of two additional treatments administered orthogonally to the donation treatments, each for half the subjects. i. This
“employability” treatment required half of participants to sign up for a jobs site and enter two jobs of interest. ii. A question and answer
treatment asked about rates of employment and salary. The latter “information” treatment occurred after the donation treatment. We do
not expect that the former treatment would have any effect on donation behavior, and our donation results do not differ substantially by
this treatment. More details on these treatments and their assignment ordering are in the online appendix.
53. A copy of the experimental instrument can be tested at https://goo.gl/qSvhi1; this will cycle through each of the treatments.
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E Appendix: Supplementary results
E.1 Randomization checks and summary statistics
Table E.2. Internet based experiments
Prolific (1) (2) (3) (4)
Before After p-value N
Personal Income (GBP) 19500.00 20652.17 0.36 209
(659.54) (1176.61)
Female 0.73 0.65 0.24 230
(0.04) (0.06)
Age 28.03 25.93 0.01 230
(0.53) (0.39)
Non-giver (self reported) 0.22 0.24 0.64 227
(0.03) (0.05)
Gave up to 50 (self reported) 0.54 0.51 0.75 227
(0.04) (0.06)
Gave over 50 (self reported) 0.25 0.24 0.93 227
(0.04) (0.05)
N 162 78
Omnibus (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.63 0.62 0.84 460
(0.03) (0.04)
Age 28.52 27.74 0.52 460
(0.72) (0.92)
FirstLangEng 0.62 0.61 0.84 460
(0.03) (0.04)
BirthNationUK 0.54 0.56 0.66 460
(0.03) (0.04)
Siblings 1.84 1.80 0.80 460
(0.08) (0.13)
DecisionModeImp 1.78 1.77 0.94 460
(0.02) (0.03)
N 304 156
Employability (1) (2) (3) (4)
Jobs Treatment 0.25 0.20 0.34 375
(0.03) (0.05)
Female 0.53 0.59 0.37 323
(0.03) (0.06)
Business 0.19 0.21 0.60 375
(0.02) (0.05)
N 300 75
Valentine’s (1) (2) (3) (4)
Anonymity treatment 2.01 1.96 0.60 205
(0.07) (0.06)
Donor treatment 2.47 2.46 0.91 205
(0.05) (0.05)
Cards sent in Val St. 0.63 0.70 0.64 205
(0.09) (0.14)
Year of study 3.29 3.23 0.83 204
(0.19) (0.19)
Female 0.76 0.69 0.26 204
(0.04) (0.05)
No religion 0.56 0.43 0.06 205
(0.05) (0.05)
University 1.85 1.74 0.29 205
(0.07) (0.07)
Previous volunteer 0.34 0.36 0.76 205
(0.05) (0.05)
Previous donor 0.65 0.71 0.36 205
(0.05) (0.05)
N 107 98
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Table E.3. Laboratory
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income Certain Before Before both After Uncertain p-value N
High Income 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.48 0.63 0.29 430
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Female 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.42 0.68 419
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Age 23.90 24.07 23.47 23.21 24.58 0.50 419
(0.65) (0.55) (0.51) (0.47) (0.82)
No religion 0.54 0.46 0.43 0.51 0.51 0.62 430
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Previous donor 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.30 0.27 0.66 430
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
N 79 74 79 115 83
Table E.4. Further summary statistics: Prolific sample
Mean Std. dev. N
Personal Income (GBP) 19880 (8498) 209
Female 0.704 (0.46) 230
Age 27.3 (5.80) 230
Non-giver (self reported) 0.225 (0.42) 227
Caucasian 0.829 (0.38) 240
Secondary school degree 0.350 (0.48) 240
Undergrad degree 0.267 (0.44) 240
Postgraduate degree 0.100 (0.30) 240
Labour party affil. 0.446 (0.50) 240
Has children 0.471 (0.50) 240
Identifies as monocultural 0.450 (0.50) 240
Notes: Key summary statistics from Prolific Academic sample, from previously collected survey ’screener’ questions. Income imputed as
mean of range-coding.
E.2 Results: Happiness, donations
Table E.5. Happiness, winning, and donations
(1) (2) (3)
Happiness at end, normalized Happiness at end, normalized Donation share (Prolific)
Won prize 0.75*** 0.31
[0.38,1.13] [-0.085,0.70]
Omnibus expt -0.39*** -0.63***
[-0.50,-0.28] [-0.84,-0.42]
Won prize, Omnibus expt 0.64***
[0.24,1.05]
Happiness at start, normalized -0.0021
[-0.029,0.025]
Observations 460 460 240
Notes: This table reports coefficients, 95% confidence intervals, standard errors, and t-test p-values from OLS regressions. Data from
Omnibus and Prolific experiments (columns 1-2), and Prolific only (column 3). Happiness variables de-meaned and divided by stan-
dard deviation, derived from self reported rating scales. Results of t-tests indicated at following significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<.05,
*** p<.001..
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E.3 Power calculations
Table E.6. Power calculations
Min d=0.2 d=0.5 d=0.8
Prolific 0.463 0.227 0.856 0.998
Omnibus 0.274 0.533 0.999 1.000
Employability 0.388 0.303 0.950 1.000
Laboratory 0.494 0.205 0.809 0.995
Valentine’s 0.688 0.129 0.530 0.902
Pooled 0.166 0.922 1.000 1.000
Pooled preregistered 0.225 0.700 1.000 1.000
Notes: This table reports results from power tests for pairwise t-tests using the actual means of the proportion of the endowment donated,
standard deviations, and observations for each experiment. Column 1 (Min) shows the standardized minimum detectable effect size
between the Before and After treatments. Columns 2 to 4 report the power to detect a Cohen’s d of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively.
E.4 Heterogeneity and nonlinearity
Table E.7. OLS on Donations: Age, gender and religiosity, pooled over experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion Level Incidence Proportion Level Incidence
Before 0.033** 0.49*** 0.089*** 0.031* 0.48** 0.074**
[0.008,0.059] [0.138,0.837] [0.048,0.130] [-0.006,0.068] [0.015,0.951] [0.003,0.145]
Female (centered) 0.065** 0.97** 0.13** 0.053* 0.79** 0.095*
[0.004,0.126] [0.164,1.767] [0.029,0.231] [-0.007,0.113] [0.012,1.562] [-0.007,0.197]
20 to <30 years -0.011 -0.22 -0.15** 0.090** 0.65 0.14*
[-0.079,0.057] [-1.091,0.653] [-0.275,-0.029] [0.022,0.157] [-0.379,1.685] [-0.018,0.305]
30 to <40 years 0.10* 1.15* -0.12* 0.23*** 2.30*** 0.18
[-0.006,0.211] [-0.168,2.468] [-0.247,0.012] [0.103,0.350] [0.734,3.861] [-0.084,0.447]
40-50 years -0.075 -0.97 -0.18 0.088 0.63 0.11
[-0.240,0.091] [-3.024,1.077] [-0.536,0.169] [-0.034,0.210] [-0.976,2.242] [-0.204,0.427]
Non-religious 0.019 0.18 0.0090 0.020 0.23 0.018
[-0.020,0.058] [-0.281,0.634] [-0.114,0.132] [-0.019,0.060] [-0.267,0.732] [-0.111,0.147]
Before × -0.045 -0.73* -0.059 -0.036 -0.68 -0.026
Female (centered) [-0.101,0.011] [-1.585,0.117] [-0.166,0.048] [-0.088,0.015] [-1.497,0.135] [-0.131,0.079]
Before × 20 -0.017 -0.12 0.084 0.028 -0.041 0.087
to <30 years [-0.183,0.150] [-2.187,1.939] [-0.128,0.297] [-0.051,0.107] [-1.054,0.972] [-0.070,0.243]
Before × 30 -0.15** -1.69** 0.014 -0.12** -1.77*** -0.0024
to <40 years [-0.271,-0.023] [-3.224,-0.160] [-0.198,0.226] [-0.225,-0.010] [-3.061,-0.474] [-0.237,0.232]
Before × 0.12 1.40 0.15 0.12 0.90 0.12
40-50 years [-0.130,0.367] [-1.573,4.379] [-0.251,0.558] [-0.039,0.272] [-0.999,2.797] [-0.209,0.458]
Before × -0.032 -0.21 0.016 -0.044* -0.42 -0.014
Non-religious [-0.091,0.028] [-0.920,0.496] [-0.140,0.172] [-0.098,0.009] [-1.037,0.198] [-0.149,0.121]
Constant 0.14*** 1.91*** 0.43*** 0.14*** 1.90*** 0.41***
[0.120,0.157] [1.636,2.178] [0.392,0.474] [0.099,0.189] [1.307,2.490] [0.336,0.484]
*DM_DExperiment* Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296
Notes: OLS regressions on donation shares of endowment, levels and incidence for Before versus After treatments; interacted with de-
meaned gender, age, non-religious", and risk attitude categorical variables, excluding donations from the lower income level. Missing
values of these variables are linearly imputed from other variables in this regression. All regressions include dummies for each experiment
(hidden). Columns 4-6 also include interactions of the Before treatment with de-meaned experiment dummies (not shown). Dependent
variables: (a) shares donated from endowment, (b) actual donation levels in Euros, (c) donation incidence. Cluster-robust standard at
the session (date) levels for the lab (web-based) experiments account for potential correlated errors at these levels. T-tests at * p<0.1,
** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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Below, we report maximum likelihood estimates of models of the form
Y αi = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + ...β jX ji + εi ,
where εi ∼ N(0,σ2).
Table E.8. Power model (nonlinear, ML) of Donation shares (from higher income), pooled over experiments
Number of obs =1353
Wald chi2(8) = 231.47
Log likelihood = 85.77, Prob >chi2 = 0.000
Donation Proportion Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Before 0.056 0.009 6.450 0.000 0.039 0.073
Dummy: Age<20 -0.137 0.034 -4.060 0.000 -0.203 -0.071
Dummy: Age 20-30 -0.053 0.020 -2.630 0.008 -0.092 -0.013
α 3.832 0.498 7.690 0.000 2.856 4.808
σ 0.227 0.004 52.020 0.000 0.219 0.236
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates of power models (dependent variable raised to the power α) of donation shares as a function of
treatment, and demeaned experiment and imputed age categories. Experiment/lab dummy coefficients hidden.
Table E.9. Power model (nonlinear, ML) of Donation shares (from higher income), pooled over experiments
Number of obs =1296
Wald chi2(17) = 184.69
Log likelihood = 67.41, Prob >chi2 = 0.000
Donation Proportion Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Before 0.060 0.011 5.57 0.000 0.039 0.081
Before × Dummy: Age<20 0.151 0.072 0.21 0.833 -0.125 0.155
Before × Dummy: Age 20-30 0.009 0.042 0.20 0.840 -0.074 0.091
Age<20 -0.147 0.056 -2.63 0.009 -0.256 -0.037
Age 20-30 -0.062 0.031 -1.97 0.049 -0.123 -0.000
Before × Female -0.032 0.028 -1.13 0.258 -0.088 0.024
Female 0.041 0.022 1.82 0.068 -0.003 0.084
α 3.722 0.503 7.39 0.000 2.735 4.709
σ 0.230 0.005 50.91 0.000 0.221 0.239
Notes:Maximum likelihood estimates of power models (dependent variable raised to the power α) of donation shares as a function of treat-
ment, and demeaned experiment, age category, and gender baseline, all interacted with treatment. Experiment/lab dummy coefficients
and interactions hidden.
E.5 Pooled results: Robustness
In table E.10 below, we demonstrate robustness to the specification and modeling choices used in table . We
report on all combinations of the following reasonable specifications; the original choices are given in bold.
• For overall, for preregistered
• Outcome measures: amount, share of endowment, binary
• Clustering/Standard Errors: Huber-white, cluster on date (where available), clustering by date/field-of
study
• Specifications: linear, logit (for extensive margin), Negative binomial, Tobit
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• Control variables: Experiment dummy de-meaned and interacted with treatment, experiment dummy
without interacted term, ridge regression results with regularization over control variables only (for Prolific
study only; as it contained the largest set of controls), Intuitive controls
Table E.10. Robustness to researcher degrees of freedom: outcome, specification, clustering, controls
Note: Notes here
(Above table being in preparation (needs formatting), as requested by JPubE referee.)
For the continuous outcomes the true data generating process must be nonlinear, as giving can never be
negative. For robustness to functional form mis-specification, we estimated a negative binomial model. This
method is more robust to heterogeneity than the Tobit specification (Gourieroux C. et al., 1984; Greene, 1994).
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E.6 Additional results by experiment
Figure E.10. Mean share committed by experiment, by Before vs. After
Table E.11. Laboratory: Donation amounts and incidence (OLS)
Levels Incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High income Low income High income Low income
Treatment ref. ref.
– Before 0.76* 0.097
[-0.077,1.59] [-0.066,0.26]
– Before-both 0.44 -0.56** 0.040 -0.17
[-0.61,1.50] [-1.07,-0.058] [-0.16,0.24] [-0.39,0.046]
– After 0.27 -0.27
[-0.78,1.31] [-1.05,0.50]
– Uncertain 0.34 -0.24 0.0050 -0.065
[-0.58,1.26] [-1.11,0.62] [-0.18,0.19] [-0.38,0.25]
– Income Certain -0.0047 0.22
[-0.23,0.22] [-0.082,0.53]
Constant 1.99*** 1.17*** 0.65*** 0.43***
[1.40,2.58] [0.66,1.68] [0.50,0.80] [0.28,0.58]
Observations 304 205 304 205
Notes: This table reports coefficients, 95% confidence intervals, standard errors, and t-test p-values from ordinary least squares regressions
on donations by Treatment for the lab experiment. The Benchmark treatment (no income or donation uncertainty) is the base group. As
dependent variables we use (a) the levels of donations in Euros (Columns 1-4) and (b) donation incidence (Columns 5-8). In the Before-
both treatment each subject made two choices – donation commitments from high income (if you win) and from low income are reported
in the corresponding columns. We account for potential session-specific correlated errors by cluster-robust standard errors. Results of
t-tests indicated at following significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.001.
E.6.1 Additional laboratory results. For the Before-both treatment, where the subjects are asked to make
pair of conditional choices, one for the each income state, we also find a lower level and incidence of dona-
tion from the lower level of income relative to the benchmark (as well as relative to the Before-both choice
for the winning state). As noted above, there are multiple interpretations of Before-both choices, so we do
not highlight this result. Finally, we find that subjects with the lower income are less likely to donate in the
Uncertain-collection treatment relative to the benchmark, where their income faced no uncertainty. This loosely
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suggests that the signaling model is not driving responses; however alternative explanations are possible, this
is significant only at p<0.10, and we did not try to replicate this in other experimental environments.
E.7 Robustness checks, by experiment
Table E.12. Negative Binomial Regressions: Donations by experiment
Panel A: Levels Prolific Lab Employability Omnibus Valentines
Donation from hi income
Before 0.66*** 0.39* 0.27 0.076 1.30***
[0.26,1.05] [-0.048,0.82] [-0.31,0.86] [-0.19,0.34] [0.42,2.18]
Constant -0.026 0.62*** 0.46* 1.09*** -1.06**
[-0.37,0.32] [0.30,0.94] [-0.069,0.98] [0.87,1.31] [-1.88,-0.25]
lnalpha 0.35** -0.25 1.95*** 0.96*** 1.54***
[0.039,0.66] [-0.74,0.23] [1.73,2.18] [0.78,1.14] [1.13,1.95]
Observations 240 129 375 460 159
Notes: This table reports reports coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from on donations for the Before treatment versus the After
treatment in each experiment, excluding donations from the lower income level.
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E.8 Related experiments
Table E.13. Comparing charitable giving experiments: Summary statistics and power
Experiment N Endowment Share
donating
Share
donated
Mean
donation
SD SD/Mean Effect
Size %
This study
- Valentine’s 159 £20 28% 4.1% £0.83 1.63 197% 103%
- Employability 375 £20 31% 8.3% £1.97 4.59 233% 25%
- Lab (all treatments) 430 €7,€14 61% 16.3% £1.99 2.5395 128% 24%
- Omnibus 460 £20 54% 26.2% £3.13 4.15 133% 8%
- Prolific 240 £10 53% 15.8% £1.58 2.1515 136% 57%
Authors’ working papers
Reinstein: Berkeley Pilot (Wave 1) 49 $10 74% 21.0% $2.10 2.06 98%
Reinstein (2010) ... Wave 2 48 $20 65% 23.0% $4.60 4.94 107% 18%
Published studies
Eckel et al. (1996) 48 $10 73% 30.1% $3.01 3.19 106%
Karlan et al. (2007) 50,083 2.0% $0.90 0.05 6% 19%
Huck et al. (2011) 25,000 N/A 4.1% 10 44%
Reinstein, Riener (2012a) 190 €5,7.5,10 57% 18.3% €1.23 1.75 142% 52%
Reinstein, Riener, 2012b 192 8 € 77% 25.0% €1.80 1.81 101% 72%
Jones et al. (2014) 150 $10 73% 37.3% $3.73 3.49 94% 21%
Tonin et al. (2014) 196 £10 81% 47.9% £4.79 3.31 69% 21%
Notes: £: UK pounds, $: US dollars, €: Euros, no inflation adjustments. In experiments with multiple donations, results reported for first Ask only. Endowment: Amount(s) paid to participants which could be donated;
vouchers for Valentines, Employability, Omnibus. N: Observations with a giving decision (Valentines: excludes non-winners). Effect size %: divides first reported (regression) result by mean donation
Kellner et al - Lab: Donation from higher income reported for "Before Both" treatment
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Also include:
F Additional material; linked/les
F.1 Additional materials and screens: Valentine’s experiment
Figure F.13. Example Valentine’s card
Participants in the Valentine’s E-card website at any of the three universities were eligible to claim a prize.
Above, a sample card is depicted.
Figure F.13. Survey to be eligible for prize
To be eligible for the prize, they also needed to complete the survey, part of which is depicted above.
Above we display the charitable ask screens, for those in the “Before” treatment, and those in the “After”
treatment who won and failed to win the prize, respectively. The University of Essex variants are displayed
only (screens for Bristol and Warwick were appropriately adjusted).
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Figure F.13. Valentine’s Before ask
Figure F.13. Valentine’s After (winners) ask
Figure F.13. Valentine’s After (winners) ask
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F.2 Additional materials and details: Employability experiment
Employability promotion (University of Essex). 12,240 total Essex students in 2013-14: 8,891 undergraduates
and 3,349 postgraduates.
Key dates and actions
First Run (4 June 2013 – 21 January 2014)
• Prize switched (from dinner to Amazon voucher) after every approximately 40 winners.
• Next academic year (Autumn 2014)
• 25 September: changed site to have it say “second or third years,” rather than “first or second years” , asked
emails to be sent out again.
• 1 November: Adapted site to include Essex Business School (EBS), which joined the Faculty of Social
Sciences in 2014
• 9 December – All relevant departments asked sent out emails (sent by 13/12 or 16/12) noting site would
close by 31 December.
• Extended deadline until 20 January
• 21 January: closed survey, final download
Second Run (14 May – 25 July 2014)
Note: No first run participants were allowed to use the site sin the second run. Entry was strictly screened
by a filtered Essex Email white list.
• 22 May, 27 May: Sent reminder emails (individually) to those who quit in the middle, giving them an
opportunity to continue from where they left off (mainly at the stage of having to sign up for JobsOnline),
with the same treatments.
• 23 June: Expanded to allow students in all University of Essex Colchester Campus departments, advertised
to the largest departments via email from departmental administrators.
Advertising (both runs)
Advertisements:
• University and Student Union Societies Facebook and LinkedIn pages
• Careers center web site noted EEP.
• Twitter from employability coordinator.
• Posters around the university campus.
We repeatedly contacted the departmental administrators from each department, who sent a series of
emails to students in participating departments. These were forwarded by administrators as coming from the
Faculty of Social Sciences.
Examples of promotional material
Second run, after 23 June: Email sent by Departmental Administrators to undergraduate students
in largest departments, on behalf of Essex Employability Prize
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Figure F.13. Poster, first run, Autumn 2014
Subject: The Essex Employability Prize: 1 in 4 will win a £20 Amazon voucher
Body: We are writing to tell you about the Essex Employability Prize, designed to promote career develop-
ment and awareness. Although this is sponsored by the Faculty of Social Sciences, they have just expanded
eligibility to undergraduate students in all departments. They are giving away over £2000 in Amazon vouch-
ers, and 1 in 4 who complete the survey will win a £20 Amazon voucher!
All undergraduate students at the University of Essex may now participate. You must complete the survey
to the end to be eligible to win, and you can only enter the survey once. If you participated in a previous EEP
you are not eligible, sorry.
The site will only be up through end of July, so please do not delay. Go to http://goo.gl/5DuppL and
complete the short survey (5-15 minutes) for a 1 in 4 chance of winning a dinner an Amazon gift certificate
for £20. (If clicking on the link does not work, please paste [full web address] into your browser)
Prizes. As advertised, all participants had a 25% chance of winning either a voucher £20 to be used at a local
Thai Restaurant, or a £20 gift certificate from Amazon.co.uk. (As noted below, at the end of the survey, 1 in 4
were given an additional 1 in 10 chance of winning a £10 Amazon voucher). In the first run, both prizes were
offered and advertised, and participants did not know which prize they were eligible for until the screen just
before the one that revealed if they won (and in the Before treatment, asked if they wanted to donate). In the
second run, only the £20 Amazon voucher was used and advertised. As mentioned above, all donations were
deducted directly from these prizes, a 10% match was added, and publicly made on a JustGiving page set up
specifically as fundraising by the Essex Employability Prize, along with any message chosen by the winner. For
those who did not indicate a message, the donations were posted anonymously, with amounts shown.
All participants were sent an email to claim their prize within roughl ytwo weeks of winning the prize.
Those who did not claim the prize soon were sent further reminders. Before issuing prizes, we checked all
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entries against the public university record and our data, to ensure they came from an eligible student email,
on his or her first valid entry to the EEP site. In the second run checking was automatic, via an email white
list.
Emails to participants. All emails to participants and winners, including responses to participant inquiries,
came from “empprize@essex” email and, where signed, were indicated as “from the Essex Employability Prize.”
Emails to winners followed a standard form; we give some example cases below.
Naka winners, standard (no donation):
Congratulations, you have won a £20 voucher at Naka Thai in Colchester. We have passed your name to them so you
can now claim your prize; please bring ID. Thanks for participating! Please encourage other eligible students to enter
the Employability Prize Giveaway.
Naka winners, donated some but not all of prize:
Congratulations, you have won a £20 voucher at Naka Thai in Colchester, and donated £X of this to [Charity= “Oxfam”
or “The World Wildlife Foundation” ]. Thank you for your donation. We have added 10% and donated £X*1.10 via
our JustGiving page [link], and left your message if you gave one. We have passed your name to Naka Thai so you can
now claim your net prize (£20-X voucher). Please bring ID. Thanks for participating! Please encourage other eligible
students to enter the Employability Prize Giveaway.
We checked prize winners at least once every two weeks while the EEP was active. Dinner winners were
emailed that the restaurant had been notified and they can claim their prize. Amazon winners were told to
check their inboxes.
People who began site but did not make it to the prize screen were emailed and directed to continue from where
they left off (same treatments):
Hi, sorry to bother you. We noticed you began the Essex Employability Prize Giveaway but did not finish it. You need
to complete this to the end to be eligible to win a prize. If you did this on your own computer or phone, just go back to
this computer or device and click here [link] and you can continue where you left off. Don’t worry, it shouldn’t take a
long time to finish!
Treatment arms. As noted, there were two additional treatment arms, administered orthogonally to each
other, and to the charity treatments. The flow of treatment assignments is depicted below.
Charity treatments (before/after and win/lose) were assigned by Qualtrics using random sampling without
replacement until 8 treatments in the urn were assigned (before-win, after-win, before-lose, before-lose, before-
lose, after-lose, after-lose, after-lose), and then the urn was reset. At the point of being asked to donate, the
probability of winning conditional on all treatments the student observed was always 1 in 4. Note that losers
were never asked to donate.
More specifically, the site:
i. Asked a student’s department (course)
ii. Went to the JobsOnline treatment (50%) or “thank you for registering,” balanced in every pair of obser-
vations within each department (sampled without replacement within each department)
iii. Within Prospects/No Prospects it balanced across all of the six below Information-win/Donation timing
combinations, with the given probabilities (ignoring department):
Treatment combination shares:
12.5% before – win (info) [1 in 8]
25% before – lose (no – info) [2 in 8]
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Figure F.13. Employability experiment treatments flow chart
12.5% before – lose (info, second chance) [1 in 8]
12.5% after – win (info) [1 in 8] 25% after (no ask) – lose (no – info) [2 in 8]
12.5% after (no ask) – lose (info, second chance) [1 in 8]
Overall shares:
Total prob info = 50%
Prob info|win = 100%
Prob info|lose = 33.33% (2 in 6)
Total prob win = 25%
Prob win|before = Total prob win|After/no ask =25%
Jobs Online (Prospects)
Third year students are typically encouraged by the Essex University Employability office to sign up as a
JobSeeker on University of Essex Jobs Online to learn about career opportunities. Half of the students who
entered the EEP web site were required to sign up for JobsOnline and enter two jobs they might be interested
in, with details verified, before they were allowed to continue. Over half of those who logged on who were
assigned this treatment quit at this point. To begin the EEP, students needed to give valid Essex emails; students
who quit were either not allowed to enter the site again, or later on, were given the opportunity to enter again
continuing from the same treatment (however, few students took this up).
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Information treatment
A second experimental arm, again given to only half of participants, involved an informational intervention
related to employment statistics. Students (based on their degree scheme) were asked to guess the share of
a relevant peer group who were employed in a graduate level job within six months of graduation, and to
guess average starting salaries. They were then told the statistics and required to enter these to continue. This
treatment was given only to those who had won a prize (before they could learn how to claim it) and to others
entered in a second draw with a 1 in 10 chance of winning a £10 Amazon voucher. This treatment always
occured after the charitable ask treatments, so these could not impact the giving decisions.
Further Screen Shots. The screens below (depending on treatment) preceded the charitable ask and prize
revelation screens shown in the main text. This version of the screens are from the earliest part of the first run,
before the site was opened to students in other years of study and other faculties (later versions were identical
except for small adaptations for these inclusions).
A copy of the experimental instrument can be tested at https://goo.gl/qSvhi1; this will cycle through each
of the treatments.
Note: In later months eligibility was expanded. In the second run only the Amazon prize was used.
Figure F.13. Welcome screens
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Figure F.13. Jobs Online Treatment or Continuation Screen
Note: only half of all participants were assigned this treatment. They had to complete this screen, and one additional one
(about a distinct category of job), and we verified legitimate responses based on the cell “type of vacancy”.
Figure F.13. JobsOnline treatment
Note: alternate screen displayed “You are eligible to win an Amazon gift certificate worth £20.”.
Figure F.13. Prize Eligibility
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Figure F.13. Win announcement
Additional material to be provided and linked
1. Output of http://www.p-curve.com/app4/
2. Web-based experiment details and key screens
• Omnibus: recruitment emails
• Recruitment screen from Prolific
3. Lab: A complete set of relevant screenshots and translations
4. Annotated extract of pre-registration and pre-analysis plan (info_foraearegistry_nonotes_GandPonly.pdf).
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